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ABSTRACT 
The rise of China and relative decline of the United States have caused a heated debate on 
a possible power shift in the Asia-Pacific. Whether China and the U.S. will become friends or 
enemies remains an unanswered question. This necessitates a thorough study on the future of 
China-U.S. relations and how they will affect the strategic chessboard in the region. 
This Thesis examines the possible scenarios of China-U.S. relations by 2030. It argues 
that while the nature of China-U.S. relations is characterized by strategic competition, increasing 
interdependence between the two countries requires them to cooperate and co-exist with each 
other. If current trends continue, by 2030, the most likely scenarios for China-U.S. relations will, 
in descending order, be a continued China-U.S. strategic competition in peaceful co-existence, a 
new Cold War, a G-2 style condominium, and a predominance by China over the U.S. in the 
Asia-Pacific. The Thesis also finds that unlike the past, China-U.S. relations will be increasingly 
influenced by external factors and unpredictable events or crises. Each of the scenarios in China-
U.S. relations will have a different but equally profound impact on the security architecture in 
the region, especially the ASEAN-led mechanisms for regional security cooperation. These 
results suggest that at times of power shifts between the U.S. and China, scenario-based planning 
can be a viable policy option for countries in the Asia-Pacific. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
3 
 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
INTRODUCTION ..................................................................................................... 6 
1. Importance ......................................................................................................... 6 
2. Theoretical Framework ....................................................................................10 
3. Literature Review ..........................................................................................14 
4. Hypothesis ........................................................................................................17 
CHAPTER I: THE NATURE OF CHINA-U.S. RELATIONS ..............................19 
1. Turbulent past, uncertain future .......................................................................19 
2. Converging and diverging interests .................................................................22 
3. The clash of values ...........................................................................................27 
4. The problem of perception and misperception, and mutual strategic distrust .28 
CHAPTER II: POSSIBLE SCENARIOS FOR CHINA-U.S. RELATIONS BY 
2030 ..........................................................................................................................32 
1. Scenario No. 1: Continued China-U.S. strategic competition in peaceful co-
existence ...............................................................................................................34 
2. Scenario No. 2: A New U.S.-China Cold War or Cool War ...........................38 
3. Scenario No. 3: A U.S.-China Condominium or G-2 ......................................44 
4. Scenario No. 4: Pax Sinica in place of Pax Americana in the Asia-Pacific ....50 
5. The “Black Swan” Scenarios ...........................................................................55 
CHAPTER III: IMPLICATIONS OF THE FUTURE OF CHINA-U.S. 
RELATIONS ON THE SECURITY ARCHITECTURE IN THE ASIA-PACIFIC: 
THE WAY AHEAD ................................................................................................60 
1. The Asia-Pacific - the principal playground of China and the U.S. by 2030 ..60 
2. What is the best scenario in China-U.S. relations for the Asia-Pacific? .........63 
3. The way forward: How will ASEAN fit in the new power equation in the 
Asia-Pacific by 2030? ..........................................................................................65 
CONCLUSION ........................................................................................................69 
4 
 
BIBLIOGRAPHY ....................................................................................................73 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
5 
 
 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS 
I would like to express my sincerest thanks to my Professors and lecturers of the Victoria 
University of Wellington (VUW) and the Diplomatic Academy of Vietnam (DAV). My special 
thanks go to Professor Robert Ayson whose critical thinking and great mentorship have made me 
realize that not everything I think or write is reasonable or necessary, which helps me improve 
myself not just in my academic endeavor but also in the long way ahead. Without his valuable 
assistance and mentorship, the completion of this Thesis would not have been possible. I also 
want to thank all my New Zealand friends during my one-month stay at VUW in Wellington - 
their hospitality and warm friendship made me realize that there are things even more significant 
than wisdom and knowledge. 
I also thank the men and women working hard in the Vietnamese Government‟s 165 
Project and New Zealand‟s Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade to expand and deepen the 
educational cooperation between the two countries, thereby making this unique scholarship 
possible. I have met some of them, and haven‟t met many others among them, to whom I am 
equally grateful.  
Finally, I would like to thank my wife, Nguyệt Minh, and my son, Thành Trung, for their 
untold sacrifice and unconditional love and support, and my parents for their ardent care and 
expectations that I would make them proud. It is the love of my dearest and nearest that has 
helped me go this far. And for them, I will try to go farther. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
6 
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
1. Importance 
The rise of China and resultant changes in China-U.S. relations will be the most striking 
feature defining international relations in the Asia-Pacific and the world in the 21
st
 century. 
Lowell Dittmer has noted that China‟s rise has been much faster than anyone expected: in 30 
years of nearly double-digit growth, China‟s share of world GDP rose from 2 percent in 1980 to 
13 percent in 2010 - the year it surged past Japan.
1
 It is widely predicted that by 2030, the U.S. 
and China will remain the world‟s two largest economies, with the latter approaching the former 
in terms of overall strength. After nearly a century as the world‟s preeminent economic power, 
the United States is projected to relinquish this title to China in 2032.
2
 As a result, a power shift 
between an established power and its most capable and ambitious challenger will take place. 
Renowned scholars and former government officials alike have referred to this as “the 
Thucydides trap” between the U.S. and China.3 The character of the China-U.S. relationship may 
be the factor which will determine whether Asia will experience peace or war, cooperation or 
competition, continued growth or stagnation.
4
 As the history of international relations since the 
Westphalia system has revealed, many power shifts were accompanied by violence and wars, but 
there were also peaceful power shifts such as the one between the Great Britain and the U.S. in 
the late 19
th
 and early 20
th
 centuries. For countries which are ideologically different like China 
and the U.S. which have fought each other directly and indirectly via proxy conflicts during the 
Cold War, it is hard to imagine that the power transition will be peaceful or smooth. But in the 
21
st
 century, with the interaction of many other important players in the region such as India, 
                                           
1
 Lowell Dittmer, “China‟s Global Rise,” Americas Quarterly (Winter 2012), p. 61. 
2
 Uri Dadush & Bennet Stancil, The World Order in 2050, Policy Outlook, Carnegie Endowment for International 
Peace, April 2010, p. 10. (Uri Dadush & Bennet Stancil, April 2010). 
3
 Robert B. Zoellick, “U.S., China and Thucydides,” National Interest, June 25, 2013, assessed online on June 30, 
2013, available at http://nationalinterest.org/article/us-china-thucydides-8642. 
4
 Michael J. Mazarr, “The Problem of a Rising Power: Sino-American Relations in the 21st Century,” The Korean 
Journal of Defense Analysis, Vol. 7, Issue 2, 1995, p. 8. 
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Russia, Japan, and ASEAN, to name but a few, there is ground for hopes that by 2030, China-
U.S. relations will be guided more by reason than by raw politics and classical great power 
competition as in the past. 
If the 21
st
 century becomes an Asian Century, it is so because of the rise of China. And if 
it becomes a Pacific Century, it is so because of the defining influence of China-U.S. relations on 
the future of the Asia-Pacific. Whatever it becomes, China will loom large in any power equation 
in the region. Napoleon Bonaparte was probably the first Western statesman to understand and 
characterize the geostrategic significance of China when he said “Let China sleep, for when she 
wakes up, she will shake the world.”5 Joseph Nye, one of the contemporary world‟s best know 
scholars, holds that one of the major power shifts of the 21
st
 century is the recovery of China. In 
1800, Asia represented half the world‟s population and half the world‟s economy. By 1900, 
because of the industrial revolution in Europe and North America, Asia‟s share of the world 
product declined to 20 percent. By the middle of this century, Asia should again represent half 
the world‟s population and product. At the same time, however, this has given rise to the fears 
that China will become a threat to the United States.
6
  
Robert Art pointed out that even if its economy never catches up to America‟s, China‟s 
remarkable economic growth has already given it significant political influence in East Asia, and 
that influence will grow as China‟s economy continues to grow.7 Today, the U.S. cannot dictate 
to China what to do and force China to accept what it must. In two decades‟ time, this trend will 
be even more consolidated, as China‟s overall strength and soft power continue to increase. The 
21
st
 century has ushered in an arguably post-hegemonic era, whereby America cannot do what it 
wants vis-à-vis much weaker states such as Afghanistan and Iraq, let alone much stronger power 
like China. 
                                           
5
 “China‟s fitful sleep,” The Economist, July 17, 1997, assessed on June 30, 2013, available at 
http://www.economist.com/node/151617. 
6
 Joseph Nye, Our Pacific Predicament, The American Interest, March/April 2013, p. 39. 
7
 Robert J. Art, The United States and the Rise of China: Implications for the Long Haul, Political Science 
Quarterly, Fall 2010, Vol. 125, No. 3, p. 359. 
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The future of China-U.S. relations will be, inter alia, the determinant for security in the 
Asia-Pacific. If current trends continue, no other major powers will likely have more influence 
on the strategic chessboard in the Asia-Pacific than China and the U.S. by 2030. It is therefore 
imperative to predict in both academic and practical manners whether China-U.S. relations will 
be characterized by more cooperation or competition, and even conflict by 2030. 
It is now hardly disputable that the rise of China is the most striking feature of the 21
st
 
century‟s international relations. At the recently held 18th Congress of the China Communist 
Party (CCP), Chinese leaders‟ stated goals to realize the “great renaissance of the Chinese 
nation,” turn China into a “maritime power” and “win local wars” mean that the Middle 
Kingdom is so serious about its comeback. China‟s increasing assertiveness in the South and 
East China Seas is just one among many examples of the fact that it is no longer satisfied with 
the regional order characterized by the US‟s preponderance since the end of the Second World 
War. The relative decline suffered by the U.S., especially after the global financial crisis has also 
given rise to much uncertainty in the Asia-Pacific region, if not the world. Stephen Walt has 
argued that for a superpower staying so long at the peak of the power echelon, there is no place 
to go but down.
8
 The power transition theory holds that the danger of great powers‟ wars is 
greatest when a rising power dissatisfied with the status quo overtakes the established power. 
Therefore, in two decades‟ time, the rise of China and the relative decline of the U.S. will lead 
the world to a dangerous moment which is a power shift. 
Since most power shifts since Westphalia were accompanied by wars or conflicts, with 
the exception of the Britain-U.S. power transition in the late 19
th
 and early 20
th
 century,
9
 it is 
tempting to assume that the power transition between the U.S. and China (if any) will be violent. 
However, international relations of the 21
st
 century are much different from what they were just 
half a century ago. With the advent of nuclear weapons, globalization, and what many scholars 
                                           
8
 Stephen Walt, “The End of the American Era,” National Interest, November/December 2011 Issue, assessed online 
at June 20, 2013, available at http://nationalinterest.org/article/the-end-the-american-era-6037. 
9
 Feng Yongping, “The Peaceful Transition of Power from the UK to the U.S.,” Chinese Journal of International 
Politics, Vol. 1, 2006, p. 83. 
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term as “the rise of the rest”, it is hardly advisable for leaders of the U.S. and/or China to think of 
war as a classical means to sort out their differences and conflicting interests. 
Nations in the Asia-Pacific, especially China‟s neighbors such as Vietnam, Japan, and the 
Philippines are among the first to bear the brunt of the adverse implications of China‟s rise 
should things go wrong. Understandably, as the United States pivots itself towards Asia, it has 
found this strategy openly or tacitly embraced by many countries in the Asia-Pacific. However, 
compounded by its economic difficulties and political gridlock, the relative decline of the U.S. 
and the arguably stellar rise of China have added a new sense of uncertainty in the region. 
Not only countries in China‟s proximity have real concerns about the adverse 
implications of the rise of China but also countries beyond China‟s immediate periphery such as 
Australia and New Zealand have begun to plan strategically how to best defend their national 
interests in expectation of an uncertain future of the China-U.S. relations. The fact that most 
countries in the Asia-Pacific region are leaving their options open when it comes to their policy 
towards China and the U.S. demonstrates how uncertain and unpredictable China-U.S. relations 
will be in the decades ahead. 
The research question this Thesis is resolving is whether China-U.S. relations will be 
characterized by more cooperation or more competition by 2030. The reason that 2030 is chosen 
as the milestone for research on the future of China-U.S. relations is because it is the time most 
prestigious think-tanks, organizations and scholars believe China will come close to the U.S. in 
terms of overall power. As predicted by the U.S. National Intelligence Council, China‟s GDP is 
expected to surpass that of the U.S. a few years before 2030.
10
 With its newfound economic 
strength, China‟s military spending is estimated to be on par with the U.S. defense budget by 
2030, making China more or less a peer competitor of the U.S. in terms of hard power.
11
 The 
                                           
10
 “Global Trends 2030: Alternative Worlds,” National Intelligence Council, December 2012, p. 16. 
11
 “China‟s Military and the U.S.-Japan Alliance in 2030: A Strategic Net Assessment,” Carnegie Endowment for 
International Peace, 2013, pp. 71-77. 
10 
 
Economist also foresees that with its double-digit growth in defense budget, China will overtake 
the U.S. in military spending in 2032.
12
 
2. Theoretical Framework 
Among the principal theories of international relations employed by scholars to explain 
and analyze China-U.S. relations, realism and liberalism as well as their immediate derivatives 
such as neo-realism and neo-liberalism are most oft-used since they are very relevant to power 
transition and interdependence respectively, which demonstrate the most striking characteristics 
of China-U.S. relations in the 21
st
 century. 
Realism and Neo-realism  
Human nature is a starting point for realism in international relations. Realists view 
human beings as inherently egoistic and self-interested to the extent that self-interest overcomes 
moral principles. Realism argues that countries follow their narrow national interest at the 
expense of the national interests of others, the world system is anarchic, and self-help is the rule 
of the game. 
Thucydides argued that the growth of Athenian power made the Spartans afraid for their 
security, and thus propelled them into war.
13
 Today, the nature of the China-US relations 
somewhat reflects the same security dilemma between the Athenians and the Spartans in the 
past. Of course the Athenians and the Spartans were not as economically interdependent as 
China and the U.S. today, but in terms of security and strategic calculations, realist thinking does 
matter in the mind of decision-makers of all country, especially at times of power shifts. 
In Theory of International Politics, which presents neo-realist argument, Kenneth Waltz 
argues that it is the system which determines the behavior of the actors, not the motivations of 
the actors themselves. The distribution of capabilities among states can vary; however, anarchy, 
the ordering principle of international relations, remains unchanged. This has a lasting effect on 
the behavior of states that become socialized into the logic of self-help. Trying to refute 
                                           
12
 See: “The Military Balance: When will China Overtake the U.S. in Defense Spending?” The Economist, assessed 
online on June 20, 2013, available at http://www.economist.com/blogs/graphicdetail/2013/03/daily-chart-11. 
13
 Thucydides, “History of the PeloponnesianWar,” trans. Rex Warner, Harmondsworth: Penguin Books, 1972. 
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neoliberal ideas concerning the effects of interdependence, Waltz identifies two reasons why the 
anarchic international system limits cooperation: insecurity and unequal gains. In the context of 
anarchy, each state is uncertain about the intentions of others and is afraid that the possible gains 
resulting from cooperation may favor other states more than itself, and thus lead it to dependence 
on others. “States do not willingly place themselves in situations of increased dependence. In a 
self-help system, considerations of security subordinate economic gain to political interest.”14 
While classical realists like John Mearsheimer argue that the international system is 
anarchic – meaning that that there is no “government of governments”15 and no authority in the 
world greater than the sovereign state – neo-realists emphasize it. For neo-realists, anarchy is the 
systemic condition that forces states to act the way they do. The system, in other words, is the 
most important constraint on state behavior, because states must act to ensure their own survival 
given such conditions. States have to be concerned first and foremost with relative gains; if they 
fail to act within the dictates of the system, they will eventually suffer for it. 
Thus, according to neo-realists, the international system is inherently conflictual. As one 
state works to achieve relative gains, for example, by building up its military strength, other 
states are forced to keep pace. This situation, where one state cannot afford to trust another's 
peaceful intentions, is known as the security dilemma. Neo-realists believe that stability is best 
achieved when a balance of power is reached by the most powerful states in the system. In War 
and Change in World Politics, Robert Gilpin mentioned “hegemonic war”, holding that war will 
break out between the dominant power and the challenger(s) if they cannot settle their 
differences in peaceful ways.
16
 Therefore, as China continues to rise and approach the U.S. in 
terms of overall strength in 2030, several big questions loom large: Will China accept the liberal 
order established by the U.S. for nearly a century ago or will it try to dislodge the U.S. from the 
Asia-Pacific region by force? Will the U.S. peacefully accept China‟s bigger share of power or 
will in launch some kind of preemptive wars to remove its biggest threat? Or will the two 
                                           
14
 Kenneth Waltz, “Theory of International Politics,” New York: McGraw-Hill, 1979, p. 107. 
15
 Peter Toft, “John J. Mearsheimer: an Offensive Realist between Geopolitics and Power,” Journal of International 
Relations and Development, Vol. 8, No. 4, December 2005, pp. 381-408. 
16
 Robert Gilpin, War and Change in World Politics, London, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1981. 
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countries, together with other important players in the region, be able to find a way to 
incorporate China into a leading position on par with that of the U.S. by 2030? From the 
perspective of both realism and neo-realism, it is hard to imagine that the power transition 
between the U.S. and China will ever be non-chaotic. This leads us to another school of thought 
which may find part of the answer to the aforementioned questions. And that is neo-liberalism. 
Neo-liberalism 
Neo-liberalism argues that even in an anarchic system of autonomous rational states, 
cooperation can emerge through the building of norms, regimes and institutions. Renowned neo-
liberals of the 20
th
 century such as Robert Keohane and Joseph Nye, who are founders of the 
neo-liberal school of thought, have proposed the concept of complex interdependence to describe 
this more sophisticated picture of global politics. They explain that complex interdependence 
sometimes comes closer to reality than realism. In explaining this, Keohane and Nye cover the 
three assumptions in realist thought: First, states are coherent units and are the dominant actors in 
international relations; second, force is a usable and effective instrument of policy; and finally, 
the assumption that there is a hierarchy in international politics.
17
 
Keohane and Nye argue that there can be progress in international relations and that the 
future does not need to look like the past, including power transition (if ever) between the U.S. 
and China. Many other China and China-U.S. relations observers such as David C. Kang, 
William H. Overholt, Kenneth D. Johnson and Edward Burman have argued for China‟s 
“peaceful rise”, dismissing determinism and pessimism characterized by the realist school and 
the power transition theory traditionally shaped by Western realist concepts of international 
politics.
18
 For example, Kang rejects the assumption raised by Aaron Friedberg in his “Will 
                                           
17
 Robert Keohane and Joseph Nye, Power and Interdependence: World Politics in Transition, Boston: Little, 
Brown and Company, 1977, pp. 23-24. 
18
 David C. Kang, “Getting Asia Wrong: The Need for New Analytical Frameworks,” International Security, Spring 
2003, 4, pp.57-85; and idem, China Rising: Peace, Power and Order in East Asia (New York: Columbia University 
Press, 2007); William H. Overholt, Asia, America and the Transformation of Geopolitics (New York: Cambridge 
University Press, 2008); Kenneth D. Johnson, China’s Strategic Culture: A Perspective for the United States 
(Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, June 2009); and Edward Burman, China: The 
Stealth Empire (Stroud: The History Press Ltd, 2008). 
13 
 
Europe’s Past be Asia’s Future?” article, explaining: “I wonder why we would use Europe‟s 
past, rather than Asia‟s own past – to explore Asia‟s future.”19 Chinese scholars such as Zhu 
Feng and Wang Jisi have also echoed similar views, pointing out “the misleading effect of 
treating Eurocentric theory and the balance of power analysis as a “universal” theory.”20 
Power transition theory holds that power shifts are normally accompanied by violence. 
But even in the late 19
th
 and early 20
th
 century when world politics were, to a certain extent, as 
raw as it was hundreds of years before, the peaceful change of hegemonic leadership from the 
Great Britain to the U.S. presented the power transition theory a special case. In World Politics, 
Organski offers the following explanations: 
 The U.S. economic growth did not alarm Great Britain; 
 The U.S. did not seek world leadership; 
 The U.S. shared fundamental values and culture with Great Britain; 
 The U.S. succeed rather than overthrowing the British order; 
 Great Britain was losing control of the international order, it was grateful that the 
U.S. picked up where Great Britain let go; 
 Great Britain eventually became the “loyal lieutenant” to the U.S.21 
Can the U.S. and China in the 21
st
 century repeat the peaceful power transition that 
occurred between the Great Britain and the U.S. a century ago? There are credible reasons that 
they can, and there are also signs that they cannot. But the world in 2030 will be much different 
from what it is today, as today‟s world is already very different from what it was just a few 
decades ago. The trend towards more peaceful co-existence between great powers seems to 
overwhelm classical great power wars and conflicts, and it will possibly be more consolidated in 
two decades‟ time.  
                                           
19
 Kang, China Rising, p. xi. 
20
 Zhu Feng, “China‟s Rise Will Be Peaceful,” p. 35; Wang Jisi, “China‟s Search for Stability with America,” 
Foreign Affairs, Vol. 84, No.5, Sep/Oct 2005, pp.39-48. 
21
 A. F. K. Organski, World Politics, 2
nd
 Ed., New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1969, pp. 361-363. 
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Complex as China-U.S. relations are, it is hard to use any single theory or school of 
thought to explain how they were or predict what shape by 2030 they will take. Offensive realists 
like John Mearsheimer, Christopher Layne and neo-liberals like Robert Keohane and Joseph Nye 
alike have to use different theories from a broader spectrum to explain China-U.S. relations. 
Therefore, in this Thesis, for the sake of a dialectical method, I am going to utilize all the three 
aforementioned theories to analyze China-U.S. relations to make some forecasts about the most 
possible scenarios instead of focusing on any single theory. 
  3. Literature Review 
Previous literature on China-US relations can be categorized into two fundamental 
schools. One school heavily influenced by realism holds that China cannot rise peacefully, 
China‟s strategic interests are increasingly conflicting with those of the U.S., and that China will 
eventually attempt to dislodge the U.S. from the Asia-Pacific and establish its own hegemony. 
Many renowned Western scholars such as Aaron Friedberg, Christopher Layne, and John 
Mearsheimer predicted that China and the U.S. are destined for strategic competition and 
conflict, and that China‟s ambitions for regional hegemony will drive most of its neighbors such 
as India, Japan, South Korea, Russia, Singapore, and Vietnam to join the U.S. to contain China‟s 
power.
22
 In China, while top Chinese leaders often play down China‟s regional and global 
ambitions, there is a significant segment of the mass as well as academic and policy-making 
circles that advocate an offensive-realist approach to dealing with the U.S. In The China Dream, 
a best-seller published in 2010 in China, Liu Mingfu, a PLA senior colonel, held that the U.S. is 
in decline and counseled that China should become the dominant power in Asia by the mid 21
st
 
century at the 100
th
 anniversary of the PRC‟s establishment. In 2009, Martin Jacques also caused 
                                           
22
 Aaron Friedberg, “Ripe for Rivalry: Prospects for Peace in a Multi-polar Asia,” International Security (Winter 
1993-1994), pp. 5-33; Christopher Layne, “China‟s Challenge to U.S. Hegemony,” Current History (January 2008), 
pp. 13-18; John Mearsheimer, “China‟s Unpeaceful Rise,” Current History (April 2006), pp. 160-162; and idem, 
“The Gathering Storm: China‟s Challenge to U.S. Power in Asia,” The Chinese Journal of International Politics 
(2010), pp. 381-396. 
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a profound academic debate as to whether China and the U.S. are well destined for an 
unavoidable conflict when their fortune in Asia shifts.
23
 
On the other hand, liberals and neo-liberals such as John Ikenberry and Joseph Nye argue 
that China‟s rise can be managed and that as it rises, China will be incorporated into the 
Western-led international system.
24
 Great thinkers and former U.S. government officials such as 
Zbigniew Brezinski and Henry Kissinger also believe that the U.S.‟s containment policy is 
useless in the U.S.‟s grand strategy in the Asia-Pacific, China‟s rise should be accepted, and that 
conflict is a choice, not a necessity for the U.S. as a strategy for dealing with the rise of China
25
. 
As Hugh White argues in The China Choice, a formula should be found for the U.S. to share 
power with China in the years to come
26
. These scholars have all pointed out the fact that China-
U.S. relations are increasingly at odds with the current order, and that the liberal order imposed 
by the U.S. in the Asia-Pacific no longer reflects the new correlation of power between the U.S. 
and China. Hugh White notes that today China is strong, and it is no longer willing to accept 
America‟s regional leadership as it did, while America still insists that the old status quo must be 
maintained.
27
  
Insightful as these scholars‟ analysis of China-U.S. relations is, their prescription and 
recommendations are, at best, flawed and naïve because international (power) politics is not that 
simple, and once the U.S. is on the apex of the power hierarchy, it is very difficult to share or 
transfer power peacefully and willingly to a challenger like China which is fundamentally 
different from itself in terms of ideology, socio-political system, values and culture. The history 
of international relations since Westphalia to date suggest that more than often, power shifts 
                                           
23
 Martin Jacques, When China Rules the World: the End of the Western World and the Birth of a New Global 
Order, New York: Penguin Books, 2009. 
24
 John Ikenberry, “The Rise of China and the Future of the West: Can the Liberal System Survive?” Foreign Affairs 
(Jan/Feb 2008); Joseph Nye, “A New Great Power Relationship?” accessed online on July 20, 2013 at 
http://belfercenter.ksg.harvard.edu/publication/22809/new_great_power_relationship.html. 
25
 Henry A. Kissinger, “The Future of U.S.-China Relations: Conflict Is a Choice, Not a Necessity,” Foreign Affairs, 
March/April 2012. 
26
 Hugh White, The China Choice: Why America Should Share Power, Black Inc., August 2012. 
27
 Hugh White, “Time for a Small Meeting of Big Powers,” Straits Times, 19 September 2012. 
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were always accompanied by upheavals, conflicts or wars due to the nature of major power 
strategic competition and the easily committed mistakes and/or misperception by either side. The 
Spain-U.S. war of 1898, the 1904-1905 Russo-Japanese war, and the First World War all testify 
to this stark reality.  
In addition, the role of domestic politics may also prevent both China and the U.S. from 
reaching any formula of power sharing. In 1972, it took a strong and visionary leader like U.S. 
President Richard Nixon to make such a strategic coup in the U.S.-China relations, which led to 
“the week that changed the world.”28 Today and in two decades‟ time, barring a great crisis at 
home or abroad, it is unlikely that any leaders in either the U.S. or China will be able to do the 
same, since the age of strong leaders are almost over. At that time, for China, only a ruler as 
powerful as Mao could make a deal with the U.S., and for the U.S., only a strongly anti-
communist President like Nixon could strike such a diplomatic overture with China without 
being perceived “weak” in domestic politics. And finally, how U.S.-China relations unfold will 
probably not be entirely decided by the two countries themselves, but largely affected by the 
action and reaction of other countries in the region, especially the allies and security partners of 
the United States. If the U.S. is forced by China or willing to step down from the peak of the 
hierarchy of power in the Asia-Pacific and hand over the baton to China, the expected response 
of its regional allies and partners as well as other strategic rivals of China in Asia would mean 
that the future ahead is very volatile.  
Therefore, China, the U.S., and virtually all other Asia-Pacific countries are facing a 
dilemma as to how to manage the China-U.S. relations and its implications for regional security. 
Kevin Rudd pointed out that Beijing‟s opposition to the U.S.‟s Asia Pivot does not mean that the 
U.S. policy is misguided, and that the reason why the Asia Pivot has been welcomed across other 
capitals in Asia is not necessarily that China is perceived as a threat, but because governments in 
Asia are uncertain what a China-dominated region would look like.
29
 Amitav Acharya proposed 
the concept of an Asian Concert of Power to engage both China and the U.S. and other major 
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powers.
30
 However, a multi-polar Asia may be more volatile than an order with the U.S.‟s 
preponderance, and a concert of Asia ignores the role of small and medium powers such as 
Vietnam, Indonesia, New Zealand, thus fuelling resistance. Therefore, a sustainable architecture 
in the Asia-Pacific will be one that gives a due role to China, keeps the U.S. in, and leaves 
ASEAN at the driving seat in a way that it can incorporate other important players such as India, 
Russia, and Japan. 
4. Hypothesis 
China-U.S. relations are subject to so many factors internally in each country and externally 
in the strategic environment in the Asia-Pacific region and the world. Complex as they are, 
China-U.S. relations in two decades‟ time will likely unfold in a way characterized by most 
power transitions between the No. 1 power and its closest challenger, with some important 
novelty made possible by the global trends of the 21
st
 century. Under a close examination of the 
most reliable strategic predictions made by prestigious think-tanks and scholars in the world, this 
Thesis is built upon the following hypothesis:   
 The rise of China and the relative decline of the U.S. will unfold in parallel, making them 
more or less peer competitors by 2030. 
 China-U.S. relations are the defining relationship in the Asia-Pacific. 
 There will be some form of power transition between the U.S. and China in the Asia-
Pacific in the next two decades or so. 
Centered on the hypothesis that some kind of power transition will take place between the 
U.S. and China around 2030, with the Asia-Pacific being the theater of such power shift, this 
Thesis will explore and make some strategic forecasts the most likely scenarios of China-U.S. 
relations in two decades‟ time, ranging from classical strategic competition to unprecedented 
structural changes made possible by the dynamics of international politics of the 21
st
 century.  
In this connection, Chapter I will analyze the nature of China-U.S. relations since the 
establishment of the People‟s Republic of China (PRC) in 1949 until today, thereby identifying 
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the undercurrents that shape and influence China-U.S. relations. Chapter II, which is the 
mainstay of this Thesis, will outline some most likely scenarios of China-U.S. relations by 2030 
in the descending order of likelihood. Chapter III, in its turn, will figure out some implications 
that each scenario of China-U.S. relations will have on the security architecture in the Asia-
Pacific, with an intentional focus on ASEAN. Finally, in the Conclusion, the author will come up 
with some concluding observations about China-U.S. relations by 2030, touching briefly on 
some general recommendations as a way forward for the region to manage China-U.S. relations 
in a way most beneficial or least detrimental to the overall interests of countries in the region. 
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CHAPTER I: THE NATURE OF CHINA-U.S. RELATIONS 
1. Turbulent past, uncertain future 
It is imperative to look into the history of the China-US relations to identify the 
undercurrents that influence their course. From the establishment of the PRC in 1949 until today, 
China-US relations have been characterized by cycles of confrontation and collusion, and 
competition and cooperation. As Yan Xuetong observes, “instability is an important 
characteristic of the China-U.S. relationship and embodies the superficial nature of the friendship 
between China and the United States.”31 From 1949 to 1972, China and the U.S. were engaged in 
bitter confrontation and fought each other directly in the Korean War of 1950-1953. With the 
diplomatic coup made by Nixon and Kissinger in 1972, China became a quasi-ally of the U.S. in 
its containment strategy against the Soviet Union for more than a decade, which was critical for 
China‟s opening up and economic reforms initiated by Deng Xiaoping since 1978. However, the 
Tiananmen incident of 1989 once again proved how fragile the foundation of U.S.-China 
relations was. Mobo Gao has noted that Tiananmen is a watershed that fundamentally changed 
U.S. perceptions of China in general and the Chinese regime in particular.
32
  
After the Cold War, while maintaining their dual approach to China, which is 
characterized by both engagement and containment, consecutive U.S. administrations seems to 
veer from calling China a “strategic partner” (during the Bill Clinton years) to a “strategic 
competitor” (since the G.W. Bush years onwards). The instability of China-US relations is 
attributed to many factors, namely geo-strategic competition, ideological difference, strategic 
misperceptions, and the upheavals in China‟s domestic politics. As China rises, there is a risk 
that the strategic distrust between the two powers will be deepened. Each country perceives the 
other as the biggest threat to its vital and strategic interests, especially in the Asia-Pacific. 
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According to Aaron Friedberg, China‟s ambition for regional hegemony runs counter to an 
axiomatic goal of U.S. grand strategy, which has remained constant for decades: to prevent the 
domination of either end of the Eurasian landmass by one or more potentially hostile powers.
33
 
Back in 2000, Condoleezza Rice wrote, “China resents the role of the U.S. in the Asia-
Pacific region. This means that China is not a “status quo” power but one that would like to alter 
the balance of power in its own favor. That alone makes it a strategic competitor, not the 
“strategic partner” the Clinton administration once called it.”34 As Aaron Friedberg concisely 
puts it, “From the Nixon administration‟s first feelers to Beijing until the Tiananmen Square 
incident and the end of the Cold War, the U.S. and China were drawn together mainly by their 
shared opposition to the Soviet Union. For the last 20 years, by contrast, the two powers have 
been united primarily by trade.” He also pointed out that the 2008-2009 global financial crisis 
“may mark the end of a period in which trade served to stabilize Sino-American relations and the 
beginning of one in which it will become a source of increasing friction and conflict.”35 In other 
words, after the Cold War and the global financial crisis, China has replaced the Soviet Union as 
the most formidable strategic rival of the United States. 
Turbulent as the past was, future China-U.S. relations will be also subject to so many 
uncertainties and unknowns, of which not everything can be in the control of China and the U.S. 
themselves. It is almost impossible to envision exactly how the region and China-U.S. relations 
will unfold in the next two decades. Peter Hays Gries notes that “regional stability, the future 
directions of Chinese nationalism, and U.S. power are the three major critical uncertainties 
influencing future U.S.-China relations.”36 Firstly, regional stability (or instability) can directly 
influence the course of U.S.-China relations because most of the potential flash points in the 
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Asia-Pacific such as Taiwan, the Korean Peninsula, the Senkaku/Diaoyu disputes, and the 
Spratlys disputes, involve China and the U.S. or its allies. Should tensions get out of control, the 
possibility of U.S. intervention in defense of its allies, and hence, risk of direct U.S.-China 
military confrontation will be very real and high. Secondly, across East Asia and especially in 
China, nationalism is on the rise, fuelled by increasingly heated territorial and maritime disputes. 
As China‟s economic growth slows down, nationalism will be increasingly used and abused by 
Chinese leaders as a tool for political purposes and national unity. This will be very dangerous 
for regional stability and future China-U.S. relations. Finally, the U.S.‟s relative decline has cast 
doubts about its ability to sustain its commitments in the Asia-Pacific region. Undermined by 
economic problems such as a huge public debt and slow economic growth as well as political 
gridlock, the U.S. will face yet greater challenges in putting its house in order, making it more 
reluctant to fully honor its foreign commitment or get involved in overseas adventures. As the 
hegemonic stabilizer of the Asia-Pacific since the end of the Second World War, the future 
course of the U.S.‟s role and staying power will greatly influence the shape of China-U.S. 
relations in the coming decades. 
However, there are also possibilities that China-U.S. relations will be characterized by 
enhanced cooperation, including in strategically important areas. Richard Weitz contends that 
there is a possibility that the more developed the Chinese economy, and the more enmeshed 
China becomes in the international economy, the less likely Chinese officials would take actions, 
such as threatening force, that could undermine their access to foreign trade, technology, and 
investment – the sources of their country‟s prosperity.37 Despite their tremendous differences, 
China and the U.S. seem to come to understand that they cannot advance their interests without 
significant cooperation from each other. Since 2009, the establishment of the Strategic and 
Economic Dialogue (S&ED) between China and the U.S. has provided an important channel for 
high-level exchange between the leadership of the two countries. Global challenges such as 
climate change, anti-terrorism, nuclear non-proliferation, and a host of other non-traditional 
security challenges such as food security, water security and energy security will require more 
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China-U.S. cooperation. The fact that there are now over 90 inter-governmental mechanisms for 
cooperation between China and the U.S. means that in the next two decades, barring unexpected 
crises or self-inflicted miscalculation or mismanagement of the bilateral relations by either side, 
there will be even more fertile ground for China-U.S. relations cooperation as well as hopes for 
positive-sum game between the No. 1 superpower and its No. 2 challenger. The recent informal 
summit between Obama and Xi Jinping at Sunnylands, California from 7-8 June 2013 has 
revealed that China and the U.S. need each other much more than they did just several years ago, 
and there is a good chance of both countries being able to build a “new type of great power 
relationship”38 that is unprecedented in the history of international relations since Westphalia. 
2. Converging and diverging interests 
In a highly globalized world, nothing binds China and the U.S. better than their shared 
economic interests. Since Deng Xiaoping opened up China to the outside world in the late 1970s, 
the economies of China and the U.S. have been increasingly intertwined and interdependent. 
According to official statistics, total U.S.-China trade rose from $5 billion in 1981 to $536 billion 
in 2012. China is currently the U.S.‟s second largest trading partner, serving as a $250 billion 
market for U.S. firms, among which many view their participation in China‟s market as critical 
to staying globally competitive. China is now the largest foreign holder of U.S. Treasury 
securities ($1.3 trillion as of May 2013). China‟s purchases of the U.S.‟s government debts also 
keep the interest rate in the latter low, facilitating economic growth and recovery in the world‟s 
largest economy.
39
 With its huge market, blossoming middle class, and an expanding economy 
which is expected to become the world‟s largest before 2030, China will provide great 
opportunities for the U.S. should cooperation between the two countries continue to override 
strategic competition. 
Economic interests aside, cooperation and shared interests between China and the U.S. 
are also increasing in other areas such as education, culture and even strategic issues. At present, 
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there are 194,000 Chinese students studying in the U.S. and 26,000 American students studying 
in China. More than 1,500 McDonal‟s outlets operating in China have reported higher profits 
than other McDonald‟s outlets in the world. China-U.S. cooperation in addressing regional flash 
points such as the Korean nuclear issue and the Iranian nuclear program has been enhanced.
40
 
However, even in economic and commercial ties where the common denominators in 
their interests are highest, frictions between China and the U.S. tend to become increasingly 
prominent. In terms of trade volume with the U.S., China still ranks behind Canada and is 
roughly on par with Mexico which are just middle powers.
41
 The huge trade deficit in 
commercial relations with China also fuels anti-China sentiments in the U.S., especially during 
election years or economic hard times. For their part, China also harbors some resentment 
towards the U.S. in economic ties. Andrew Nathan and Andrew Scobell explain: “although 
China has embraced state capitalism with vigor, the Chinese view of the U.S. is still informed by 
Marxist political thought, which posits that capitalist powers seek to exploit the rest of the 
world… And although China runs trade surpluses with the U.S. and holds a large amount of U.S. 
debt, China‟s leading analysts believe the Americans get the better end of the deal by using 
cheap Chinese labor and credit to live beyond their means.”42 
Joseph Nye admits that “if we [America] treated China as an enemy, we were 
guaranteeing an enemy in the future. If we treated China as a friend, we could not guarantee 
friendship, but we kept open the possibility of more benign future”.43 Few would contend Nye‟s 
wisdom. Economically interdependent as they are, China and America‟s domestic politics and 
their strategic distrust will probably prevent them from making significant concessions to each 
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other. As China rises and the power gap between it and the U.S. narrows, this will be make the 
U.S. more insecure and China more impatient about a perceived power shift. It is no surprise that 
Chinese leaders and policy-makers are now viewing the Asia Pivot or rebalancing strategy of the 
U.S. in the Asia-Pacific as America‟s design to contain or constrain the rise of China. For their 
part, U.S. leaders and numerous scholars view China as an increasingly revisionist power with an 
unhidden ambition to dislodge the U.S. from the Asia-Pacific and dethrone it as the world‟s No. 
1 superpower. The strategic goals of China and those of the US in the Asia-Pacific seem to be 
increasingly contradictory. The more China rises, the more insecure America would feel about 
its eroding role in the region; and the more engaged America becomes in the region, the more 
alarmed China would feel about its perceived “core interests” being encroached. As Denny Roy 
argued, both China and the U.S. want peace, but on their own terms. Some of what China calls 
“defensive” looks to others like aggression. What America terms “stability” is “containment” to 
China.
44
 Furthermore, the values that America represents are so different from the principles 
championed by the Chinese leadership. China is too big and too proud to be satisfied with any 
valued or ideas it considers imported from the West. That is why even when China has 
effectively adopted state capitalism, it still claims to be practicing “socialism with Chinese 
characteristics”.  
At present, the U.S. seems to be at a loss in determining what is the best China policy. 
Within the U.S., economic difficulties and political gridlock hamper America‟s foreign relations 
and its China policy in particular. Back in 2001, David Shambaugh observed that “a divided 
Congress and a President with a weak mandate will have to work together and sell a new China 
policy to the public.”45 The U.S.‟s dual strategy of “congagement” (which is a combination of 
containment and engagement) followed consistently by eight U.S. Presidents from Richard 
Nixon to Barack Obama is not going to work in the long term. Justin Logan held that 
congagement, for all intents and purposes, has been America‟s China policy since at least the end 
of the Cold War, and that the congagement approach was built on contradictory policies, because 
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the two aspects of congagement do not complement each other – they work at cross purposes.46 
The US cannot engage China without accepting to give it a bigger role in the foreseeable future; 
and the US cannot contain China without losing the economic benefits from the China-US 
relations. Simply put, in the long run, the US can have either objective, but not both.  
At the beginning of his first term, with America devastated by the global financial crisis 
and the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, Obama tried to accommodate China by emphasizing the 
engagement aspect of the congagement strategy. The 2009 China-U.S. Joint Statement 
mentioned the “core interests” with a clear sign of accommodating China.47 However, China‟s 
increasing assertiveness in the East and South China Seas and its perceived lack of cooperation 
on critical issues such as North Korea have made diverging interests between the two countries 
more tangible. The U.S. views China‟s “nine-dash lines” claim in the South China Sea as a 
Chinese version of the Monroe Doctrine in East Asia. For a superpower with global interests like 
the U.S., accepting China‟s overbearing assertiveness towards countries in the region may herald 
the end of the liberal order imposed by the U.S. since 1945. At the 17
th
 ASEAN Regional Forum 
(ARF) Meeting in July 2010 in Hanoi, Secretary of State Hillary Clinton declared that the United 
States had national interests in the freedom of navigation in the South China Sea, prompting 
many other countries to raise the issue of the South China Sea, which was unprecedented at 
previous ARF meetings.
48
 This declaration was a watershed in the U.S.-China relations in the 
Obama administration. The fact that the concept of “core interests” did not appear in the 2011 
China-US Joint Statement during Hu Jintao‟s visit to America means that the US has come to 
learn that it is futile to appear too accommodating to China.
49
 It is for this very reason that since 
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the last two years of the first Obama administration, the hedging and containment elements in the 
US‟s China congagement strategy have been gaining momentum.  
Some scholars such as Arvind Subramanian, Robert Ross, Yan Xuetong, and Wang Jisi 
argue that it is the U.S.‟s Asia Pivot or rebalancing strategy that unnecessarily provokes China 
and destabilizes the region. On the opposite spectrum, scholars such as John Mearcheimer, 
Aaron Friedberg, Stephen Walt, James Holmes, Michalel Auslin, Christopher Layne, Elizabeth 
Economy, and Dan Twinning believe that it is China‟s assertiveness and “misbehavior” that 
caused the US to rebalance towards the Asia-Pacific. All the afore-mentioned conducts of China 
occurred well before the US announced its Asia Pivot by Secretary of State Hillary Clinton in her 
article “America‟s Pacific Century” in Foreign Policy in October 2011.50 Most U.S. policy-
makers and scholars have now come to understand that with regard to the U.S.‟s China policy, 
engagement and balancing are mutually reinforcing, rather than opposing.
51
 As such, it seems 
that cooperation and competition in China-U.S. relations are always two sides of a coin, and 
whether cooperation overrides competition or vice versa depends much on each country‟s 
perception of the other as well as fluctuations in either country‟s domestic politics. 
Christopher Layne argued that if the US tries to maintain its current dominance in East 
Asia, a Sino-American conflict is virtually certain
52
. John Mearsheimer, another realist, has 
argued that a wealthy China would not be a status quo power but an aggressive state determined 
to achieve regional hegemony.
53
 The US‟s survival and vital interests are not in the Asia-Pacific, 
but those of China are. It is likely that in one or two decades‟ time, the US will have to adopt a 
more consistent approach to dealing with China. Since the U.S. cannot contain China or stop its 
rise, it will have to learn to share power with China and even accept China‟s preeminence in the 
West Pacific, if not all the Asia-Pacific. When China approaches the US in terms of hard power 
at some time in the late 2020s or so, it is for sure that it will not accept the rules and norms 
                                           
50
 James Holmes, “The Pivot Didn‟t Cause China‟s Misbehavior,” The National Interest, February 4, 2013, at 
http://nationalinterest.org/commentary/the-pivot-didnt-cause-chinas-misbehavior-8054. 
51
 Ely Ratner, “Rebalancing to Asia with an Insecure China,” The Washington Quarterly, Spring 2013, p. 32. 
52
 Christopher Layne, “China‟s Challenge to U.S. Hegemony,” Current History, January 2008. 
53
 John J. Mearsheimer, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics (New York: W.W. Norton, 2001), p. 402. 
27 
 
imposed by America in the Asia-Pacific since the end of the Second World War since those rules 
and norms were made without the participation of China. As a rising power, China will demand 
more, not less, sphere of influence commensurate with its new-found strength.  
3. The clash of values  
At the core of their national identity, China and the U.S. are very different from each 
other. Peter Hays Gries notes that “Chinese identity today involves an ethno-cultural nationalism 
that highlights a pure Han ethnicity and a pride in China‟s “5,000 years of civilization… 
American identity, by contrast, is largely ideological and not ethno-cultural. It is a civic 
nationalism centered on a particularly American liberalism that has at its heart a fierce insistence 
on individual freedom set against an authoritarian state.”54 With the end of the Cold War and as 
China integrates deeper into the global economy and institutions, the role of ideology seems to 
have been blurred. But now that the U.S. feels more and more threatened by the rise of China, 
ideology tends to become an increasingly important factor in U.S.-China relations in the coming 
years. As Aaron Friedberg succinctly puts it, “ideological differences, and ideologically rooted 
animosities, may reinforce the dynamics of mutual insecurity at work in the U.S.-China 
relationship.”55 As China expert David Shambaugh said in an interview, there is a “systemic 
struggle” between China and the U.S., and “the stronger and more assertively nationalistic China 
becomes, the sharper the tensions will become.”56 
More than 20 years after the collapse of the Soviet Union, China remains one of few 
communist and authoritarian countries in the world. From the perspective of the U.S. and the 
West, China seems to be “the odd man out,” going against the wind of liberalization and 
democratization in the world. For its part, as argued by Arleen Freeman and Nathan Li, the CCP 
has long rejected and detested what the U.S. and the West consider universal values. It 
demonizes universal values and consistently uses state media to heighten and even misrepresent 
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the drawbacks of democracy and freedom. It stresses “Chinese characteristics” and that Western 
values do not harmonize with “Chinese characteristics.” They hold that what the CCP is counting 
on is not just that the U.S. will lose jobs (or economic benefit) to China, but also lose its spiritual 
base: the American ideals, its founding principles, and its universal values, because they are the 
CCP‟s greatest threat.57  
Moreover, the model championed by China (or the “Beijing Consensus”) which means an 
autocratic system with tight political control, an emphasis of the role of the state over individual 
and civil rights, is at odds with the liberal democracy model fiercely defended by the U.S. and 
the West. China‟s economic success has also advanced the “Beijing Consensus” at the expense 
of the “Washington Consensus”. As Edward Friedman argued, authoritarian China‟s success is 
attracting imitators around the world, showing that China‟s Communist Party seems to know 
how to achieve economic growth, maintain stability, become a global power, and hold on to a 
monopoly of power at home.
58
 This effectively hurts the very core ideals of American 
exceptionalism and the conviction that America‟s set of values are unique and best for the world. 
Due to the conflicting values and ideals, the U.S. has always criticized China‟s human rights 
record, placing it in the Country of Particular Concern (CPC) list for a long time together with 
the so-called “rogue states” such as North Korea, Iran, and Sudan. For a country that prides itself 
on its 5,000-years-odd civilization, it is natural that China finds it hard, if not impossible, to 
accept the set of values imposed by the U.S., which is perceives as detrimental to both its cultural 
identity and regime security. 
4. The problem of perception and misperception, and mutual strategic distrust 
Mainstream international relations theory tends to dismiss the possibility of 
understanding the importance of perceptions and intentions in world politics. John Mearsheimer 
contends that there is no way to know the intentions that drive other states, so the only thing a 
rational state can do is to build up its military capabilities and prepare for the worst.
59
 However, 
                                           
57
 Arleen Freeman and Nathan Li, A Clash of Values, Chinascope, Jan/Feb 2013, p. 12. 
58
 Edward Friedman, “China‟s Return to Global Glory,” Global Dialogue, Winter/Spring 2007, p. 9. 
59
 John Mearsheimer, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics, New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 2001. 
29 
 
Robert Jervis argued that “perceptions of the world and other actors diverge from reality in 
patterns that we can detect and for reasons that we can understand.”60 
In a relationship as complex as that between the U.S. and China, perception does matter. 
Due to its past humiliation at the hands of the West, China tends to view the U.S. as an imperial 
hegemon seeking to carve up or dismember China. Kurt Campbell and Richard Weitz have 
pointed out that the U.S. and the PRC each remains suspicious of the other‟s true objectives and 
behaviors. For example, in terms of military cooperation, whereas Washington fears that the 
Chinese were exploiting contacts to acquire military secrets, Beijing worries that the U.S., for all 
its talks of engagement, ultimately hopes to subvert Chinese communism.
61
 Beijing always 
interprets Washington‟s decisions to maintain its Cold War troop levels in East Asia, strengthen 
security ties with Japan, and back Taiwan in its confrontations with China as means of limiting 
the PRC‟s regional influence.62 As long as Taiwan remains de facto independent of China, which 
seems highly certain at least over the next ten years, it is hard, if not impossible, for China to 
build strategic trust with the United States or view the latter in a positive manner. Taiwan 
remains the biggest reminder of the wounded national pride and unfulfilled reunification dream, 
which makes the U.S. the main culprit. Chinese military leaders view the U.S. as the main 
impediment to China either reacquiring Taiwan or assuming its rightful place as East Asia‟s 
leading power.
63
 The U.S. bombing of the Chinese Embassy in Belgrade in 1999, the U.S. spy 
plane collision off Hainan island in 2001, and the ongoing Asia Pivot followed by the U.S. have 
reinforced China‟s perception that the U.S.‟s strategy is aimed at containing China strategically 
and stopping its rise. Heavily influenced by offensive realism, many Chinese analysts and 
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policy-makers believe that the U.S. cannot be satisfied with the existence of a powerful China 
and therefore seeks to make the ruling regime there weaker and more pro-American.
64
 
It seems that both scholars and government officials from both countries fail 
systematically to seek to understand how others view the world, thus allowing misperceptions 
and consequently conflicts to grow. If the current trends continues, this problem will get worse 
by 2030, when China becomes more assertive and the U.S. more insecure. As the two countries 
seem to get more and more trapped in the security dilemma, especially since the Obama 
administration officially declared its Asia Pivot (or rebalancing strategy) in late 2011, 
uncertainty and misperceptions between China and the U.S. has become the order of the day. 
Andrew Nathan and Andrew Scobell have rightly pointed out that “just as Americans wonder 
whether China‟s rise is good for U.S. interests or represents a looming threat, Chinese policy 
makers puzzle over whether the U.S. intends to use its power to help or hurt China.”65 This 
uncertainty and the lack of transparency, especially on the part of China as perceived by the U.S., 
have driven the two countries increasingly suspicious of each other‟s future intentions and 
capabilities.  
Kenneth Lieberthal explains what he terms “mutually assured distrust” between China 
and the U.S. by noting that “the single biggest failure of 30 years of diplomatic ties between 
Washington and Beijing is that neither side, even today, trusts the long-term intentions of the 
other towards itself,” and that “because the distrust concerns long-term (that is, 10-to-20-year) 
intentions rather than immediate goals and policies, it is very difficult to change.”66 Peter Hays 
Gries has argued that the U.S.‟s national identity lies at the heart of many American 
misunderstandings and misperceptions of China.
67
 The history of America‟s independence and 
                                           
64
 Andrew J. Nathan and Andrew Scobell, op. cit. p. 36. 
65
 Andrew J. Nathan and Andrew Scobell, How China Sees America, Foreign Affairs, Vol. 91, No. 5, 
September/October 2012, p. 33 
66
 Kenneth Lieberthal, “The China-U.S. Relationship Goes Global,” Current History, Vol. 108, Issue 719, 
September 2009, pp. 243-244. 
67
 Peter Hays Gries, “Problems of Misperception in U.S.-China Relations,” Orbis, Vol. 53, Issue 2, March 2009, p. 
223. 
31 
 
nation-building inspires fear and loathing about the subordination of individuals to a strong state 
such as China, which is always perceived by the U.S. as an authoritarian communist state. On 
their part, Chinese leaders and policy-makers believe that the root cause of the U.S.-PRC 
tensions is American ignorance of, and insensitivity toward China. For a country that views the 
world through the prism of the “century of humiliation” and is always allergic to foreign 
imposition, this perception fuels more and more distrust of the U.S., sending the two countries 
into action-reaction cycles that will further undermine the foundations of their relationship. 
Because of its tumultuous historical legacy over the past 100 years, China craves for a rightful 
place on the world stage and wants the established power to recognize its new-found strength, 
and hence, status. Robert Pastor has argued that “China combines a new confidence and strength 
with an older insecurity and inferiority complex. This is a potentially combustible 
combination.”68 The more China perceives that it is contained and encircled by the U.S., the 
more extreme its reactions will be whatever the cost it may take and however weak or strong 
China may be.  
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CHAPTER II: POSSIBLE SCENARIOS FOR CHINA-U.S. RELATIONS 
BY 2030 
The end of the Cold War removed the most important common denominator in the 
strategic interests of China and the U.S., namely the containment of the Soviet Union. As Arthur 
Waldron has put it, “the Cold War has ended, and with it the external imperative for Sino-
American rapprochement.”69 The 1989 Tiananmen incident also added another complex irritant 
to the relations between China and the U.S. and the West. As a result, the strategic interests of 
China and the U.S. became more and more divergent instead of being virtually convergent as in 
the 1970s and 1980s. The U.S. increasingly views China as its strategic competitor, not a 
strategic partner. While the Clinton administration sought to engage China in the hope that this 
process would lead to gradual transformation of the country, the George W. Bush administration 
became cold to the idea of forging a strategic partnership with China. Since the global financial 
crisis of 2008-2009 onwards, the U.S. has decidedly identified China as the most formidable 
challenge to the U.S.‟s No. 1 position in the world. In light of the ongoing trend as well as the 
traditional characteristics of power shifts taking place since the establishment of the Westphalian 
system, strategic frictions in the China-U.S. relations are likely to rise as China eventually catch 
up with the U.S. in terms of overall strength. These fluctuations demonstrate how complex 
China-U.S. relations are, and that China-U.S. cooperation and competition seem to be two sides 
of a coin, with either cooperation or competition as the overriding trend quite depending on the 
situation as well as the foreign policy priorities of the U.S. and those of China. 
As China rises and the U.S. suffers a relative decline, the balance of power between the 
No. 1 power and its closest challenger will be dramatically changed in the next two decades or 
so. Back in 2005, Zbigniew Brezinski explained, “there will be inevitable frictions as China‟s 
regional role increases and as a Chinese “sphere of influence” develops. U.S. power may recede 
gradually in the coming years, and the unavoidable decline in Japan‟s influence will heighten the 
sense of China‟s regional preeminence.”70 One school of thought holds that by 2030, China will 
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be able to establish primacy in the Asia-Pacific
71
 while the other places its bet on the resilient 
preponderance of the U.S. as the most important player in the regional strategic chessboard.
72
  
However, few scholars can be totally sure of the exact future of the China-U.S. relations by 
2030. Robert Art has pointed out three key benchmarks which are critical for the analysis of 
future China-U.S. relations: “First, we cannot predict with any certainty the content of China‟s 
intentions, but we can with confidence state that they will be more expansive than they are now. 
Second, the United States, short of preventive war, which is not a viable policy, cannot stop 
China‟s rise, although perhaps it could slow that rise for a time through hostile economic 
policies. Third, we should not assume that the Sino-American relationship is doomed to repeat 
the dismal record of the three previous dominant power-rising power dyads of the last 100 years, 
because there are marked differences between the former and the latter three”.73 The future of 
China-U.S. relations are subject to so many variables, among which even those within each 
country and its leadership are already too difficult to predict, let alone external or unexpected 
variables. Globalization, the diffusion of power, nuclear weapons, the rise of the rest, and a host 
of other factors will probably dictate that whether they like it or not, the U.S. and China will not 
be able to allow their relations to follow the historical precedents of power shifts before the First 
and Second World Wars. 
As the course of development of a country is hardly a linear path, but may be subject to 
internal and external variables, the strategic futures of China, the U.S. and the China-U.S. 
relations can unfold in different ways. While uncertainty seems to be the order of the day, most 
countries in the Asia-Pacific will have been keeping their options open until the future of the 
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China-U.S. relations is decidedly shaped some time by 2030. Therefore, the possible scenarios of 
the China-U.S. relations will serve as the defining factor for the future of the Asia-Pacific as well 
as the basis for policy formulation and execution by most countries in the region. According to 
the strategic forecast of most scholars and think-tank, the followings are the most likely 
scenarios of the China-U.S. relations by 2030: 
1. Scenario No. 1: Continued China-U.S. strategic competition in peaceful co-existence 
The conventional knowledge is that China‟s rise will lead to a power shift between the 
U.S. and China at some time before 2030. However, as James Morrow has argued, the 
international status quo does not change as rapidly as capabilities.
74
 It took the U.S. 75 years to 
become the No. 1 superpower in the world. For a country with so many complex internal and 
external challenges like China, that process may be even longer. Even if China‟s GDP surpasses 
that of the U.S. sometime in the 2020s, it is likely that by 2030, China will have not been able to 
match the U.S. in terms of overall strength, so it will not challenge the U.S. directly but choose 
to continue to compete with the U.S. while accumulating its power until the day it can overthrow 
the U.S. from the No. 1 position. Many of the fifth-generation Chinese leaders admit that China 
will need a peaceful environment for development for 30 to 50 years, and that the U.S. will 
remain the most powerful country for at least that long.
75
 In his 2010 article in People‟s Daily, 
Dai Bingguo, China‟s top diplomat, claims that China does not seek hegemony and will never 
compete with other countries for leadership in the region, seek so-called joint hegemony or 
followed so-called Monroe Doctrine.
76
 
According to David Shambaugh, “China is, in essence, a very narrow-minded, self-
interested, realist state, seeking only to maximize its own national interests and power. It cares 
little for global governance and enforcing global standards of behavior (except its much-vaunted 
doctrine of noninterference in the internal affairs of countries). Its economic policies are 
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mercantilist and its diplomacy is passive. China is also a lonely strategic power, with no allies 
and experiencing distrust and strained relationships with much of the world.”77 While the U.S. 
has more than 50 formal military allies, China has none, with North Korea and Pakistan being 
just “quasi-allies” that often become more of a liability than a strategic asset for China. Aware of 
its limits, China will not take radical steps but rather incremental ones to change the status quo in 
its favor, avoiding an abrupt change in its relations with the U.S.  
By comparison, Stephen Walt argued in The End of the American Era that the primacy 
that the U.S. enjoyed since the end of the Second World War is now over, and in the next two or 
three decades, the U.S. will have to accept the fact that it is just one of the great power, or primus 
inter pares. If the current economic growth rate of 7-8 percent annually continues, China‟s GDP 
will double by 2020, surpassing that of the U.S. sometime before 2030. This will allow China to 
further modernize and strengthen the PLA to make the US think twice about intervening in any 
regional crisis to come to the rescue of its allies should conflicts break out. China‟s geo-strategic 
location in the Asia-Pacific is also a huge advantage over the US, which is an ocean away from 
the theater. The anti-access and area-denial strategy employed by China also neutralizes the 
U.S.‟s technological superiority, making it more costly for the U.S. to intervene militarily in East 
Asia in defense of an ally in conflict with China. China‟s ambitions are not to challenge the U.S. 
on a global scale, but within the Asia-Pacific where it enjoys the advantage of geographical 
proximity. Unlike the Soviet Union in the Cold War, China will not seek to dethrone the system 
and values championed by the U.S., but choose instead to increase the cost of a possible U.S. 
intervention in East Asia, at least before 2030. To that end, China is now relatively well-
prepared, and it will be more and more confident by 2030. 
The 2008 U.S. National Intelligence Council‟s Global Trends 2025 report predicts that, 
over the next two decades, the U.S. will become just primus inter pares (or the first among 
equals) in a multi-polar international system that will effectively end what was always an 
artificial “unipolar moment.”78 The U.S.‟s economic power has been dented by the global 
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economic recession, forcing it to realize and gradually accept the rise and new-found strength of 
China. 
However, in absolute terms, the U.S. will be able to maintain its edge over China for at 
least another two decades. Even when China‟s GDP surpasses that of the U.S. at some time in 
the 2020s, it will still lag behind the US in terms of military power projection capability, a 
network of strong and reliable allies and security partners, virtual dominance of international 
economic institutions, and soft power. Chinese leaders understand very well their limits, and may 
not decide to challenge the US directly unless an unexpected crisis at home or in the region 
happens, making China‟s decision-makers hostage to internal political calculations or nationalist 
sentiments. In the foreseeable future, at least until the 2020s, barring an unexpected crisis, China-
U.S. relations will be characterized by both cooperation and strategic competition. At the heart of 
the question, while many of their strategic interests are divergent, China does not threaten the 
survival of the U.S., which leads many in the U.S. to question the wisdom of directly confronting 
China.
79
 Furthermore, the growing economic interdependence between China and the U.S. 
means that America cannot punish China without seriously hurting itself. In the Cold War, the 
Soviet Union‟s GDP never exceeded half that of the U.S., and the two countries had virtually no 
economic or commercial ties. On the contrary, well before 2030, China‟s GDP will likely 
surpass that of the U.S., and the economic future of China and the U.S. will be bound even more 
closely. More and more voices in the U.S.‟s business and political circles, even renowned and 
influential figures such as Henry Kissinger and Zbigniew Brezinski are questioning the rationale 
and sensibility of countering China.
80
 As the U.S. becomes more and more intertwined 
economically with China in the coming decades, voices like this will increase and have a major 
impact on the political discourse in the U.S., making its leaders even more reluctant to confront 
China. 
Right after the CCP‟s 18th Congress, Chinese leaders repeatedly emphasized the need to 
build a “new type of great power relations” with the U.S., showing that China does want to 
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stabilize the relationship. In terms of foreign policy, the CCP‟s 18th Congress still gave the No. 1 
priority to China‟s relations with the U.S., appointing top diplomats having deep background and 
much experience in China‟s relations with the U.S. such as Yang Jiechi and Cui Tiankai. As 
China still attaches much importance to its “period of strategic opportunity”, it is likely that the 
strategic competition aspect in China-U.S. relations will be relatively controlled within an 
acceptable framework. For its part, in the next decade, it is likely that the U.S. will seek closer 
economic integration with China and utilize over 90 inter-governmental cooperation mechanisms 
currently existing between the two countries while consolidating its alliances and seeking new 
strategic partnerships in the Asia-Pacific to hedge against a possibly more aggressive China in 
the future. 
The complex interdependence between China and the U.S. will require both countries to 
continue to engage each other in a relatively peaceful competitive co-existence. China-U.S. 
relations will be characterized by a mutual accommodation of power and interest by either party 
since neither China nor the U.S. can impose hegemony in the Asia-Pacific or pursue their 
stategic interests without significant cooperation of the other. As described by David M. 
Lampton, China and the U.S. will be locked into a “double game” that will be conducive for 
continued peace and stability in the region: “For China, the gamble is that the Americans will 
countenance, indeed cooperate with, their rise, even as they have misgivings and as some in the 
U.S. Government and elsewhere in society periodically contemplate taking a more 
confrontational path. And for America, the bet is that a powerful China two or more decades 
hence, woven into the fabric of international society and a beneficiary of the globalization that 
energized its growth in the first place, will become in the words of one Chinese scholar in 
Shanghai, “a responsible, decent role model for others.”81 Echoing this view, Robert Sutter has 
also argued that “even hard-line Chinese critics of U.S. “hegemony” in Asian and world affairs 
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have been compelled in recent years to adopt a low posture in dealing with the U.S., choosing to 
wait as China builds comprehensive national power over the coming decades.”82 
Therefore, barring any unexpected big crisis, U.S.-China relations in 2030 will look 
relatively similar to what they are today, with the power equation increasingly favorable for 
China as it continues to rise. This trend will further deepen the strategic competition and rivalry 
between the two countries but will not lead to a situation whereby both countries allow their 
relations to spiral out of control. As a result, the future of the Asia-Pacific will continue to be 
shaped by China-U.S. relationship, with other major powers such as India, Japan and Russia all 
playing more or less important role. Within this regional architecture, ASEAN‟s centrality will 
likely be maintained because no single great power, be it China or the U.S., will be strong 
enough to impose an order to its liking.  
2. Scenario No. 2: A New U.S.-China Cold War or Cool War 
John Mearsheimer argues that “a wealthy China would not be a status quo power but an 
aggressive state determined to achieve regional hegemony,” and that “China is still very far away 
from the point where it has enough latent power to make a run at regional hegemony. So it is not 
too late for the U.S. to reverse course and do what it can to slow the rise of China. In fact, the 
structural imperatives of the international system, which are powerful, will probably force the 
U.S. to abandon its policy of constructive engagement in the near future.”83 The rise of China 
and its increasingly assertive behavior have reinforced realist and zero-sum thinking in the U.S. 
to a great extent. China, concludes Denny Roy, “is a dissatisfied power,” still trying to “recover 
territory and prestige lost to the West. The Chinese leadership “perceives the international 
environment as primarily hostile, and their own place within it insecure.”84 In other words, China 
bears all the trademarks of a revisionist power. If China continues to rise more or less as it has in 
the past three decades, well before 2030 China will be the largest economy in the world and 
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possess a much stronger military force that can challenge the U.S. in many aspects, especially by 
its anti-access and area-denial strategy. If this is the case, the U.S. will face a hard choice either 
to accept China‟s preeminence in the Asia-Pacific or take measures aimed at crippling China 
economically, diplomatically, and militarily. The history of power shifts in the world, the vested 
strategic interests of the U.S. in the Asia-Pacific, and the self-perceived American 
exceptionalism all suggest that the U.S. will likely opt for the latter policy option by launching a 
new Cold War (or Cool War) against China. There are many reasons for that. 
Firstly, China and the U.S. are different by ideology. As Michael Mazarr has put it, 
“Sino-American relations suffer from a basic fact of life in international politics: democracies 
and dictatorships generally do not get along well.”85 Aaron Friedberg also argues that although 
China is no longer following Marxist ideology, it is still adopting the Leninist orthodoxy of the 
authoritarian one-party system loathed by the U.S. and the West.
86
 The U.S. expects that in the 
course of its economic development, China will eventually undergo political liberalization, and 
that a liberal and democratized China will behave in a more benign manner towards the U.S. and 
other countries in the region. From the Chinese perspective, the U.S.‟s design to democratize or 
liberalize China means subversive efforts by “hostile forces” led by the U.S. and the West to 
weaken or even dismember China. As such, a seemingly good-willed intention by one power is 
perceived as outright hostility by the other, making strategic distrust between China and the U.S. 
all but imminent. 
Secondly, well before 2030, the U.S. will face a dilemma in its policy options towards 
China and its closest allies in the region, namely Japan, South Korea, and the Philippines. If the 
U.S. wants to improve and stabilize its relations with China, some strategically important 
concessions must be made with regards to the U.S.‟s policy towards Taiwan, Japan, South 
Korea, and the Philippines, to name but a few. But this will run counter to the U.S.‟s vital 
interests of preserving its No. 1 position as well as the liberal order it established after the 
Second World War. In short, the U.S. cannot have everything it wants, since as pointed out by 
                                           
85
 Michael J. Mazarr, op. cit., p. 21. 
86
 Aaron Friedberg, “In U.S.-China Relations, Ideology Matters,” Foreign Policy, July 1, 2011, at 
http://shadow.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2011/07/01/in_us_china_relations_ideology_matters. 
40 
 
Stephen Walt, the American Era is arguably over now,
87
 and will be a distant memory by 2030. 
Even if China does not equal the U.S. in terms of overall strength by 2030, the U.S. will still be 
unable to impose its will on China the way it does now. In its periphery, China‟s anti-access and 
area-denial strategy poses a daunting challenge to the U.S. by raising the cost of military 
intervention to the level that the American society cannot accept. 
As Yan Xuetong, a renowned Chinese realist scholar points out, “if history is any guide, 
China‟s rise does indeed pose a challenge to America. Rising powers seek to gain more authority 
in the global system, and declining powers rarely go down without a fight. And given the 
differences between the Chinese and American political systems, pessimists might believe that 
there is an even higher likelihood of war”.88 As the two countries‟ possession of nuclear weapons 
makes direct wars a mutually assured destruction, a new Cold War or Cool War may seem to be 
a favorite choice by both. The 2008 global financial crisis has given rise to a surge of confidence 
among China‟s elite and populace who increasingly believe that the U.S.‟s days in the Asia-
Pacific are numbered. In an opinion poll in early 2010, more than 50 percent of Chinese 
surveyed were of the view that “China and America are heading for a new Cold War.”89 
David Shambaugh has pointed out that China presents the U.S. with a challenge it has 
never experienced before, i.e. competing strategically with an opponent which is highly 
interdependent with it in terms of economic interests. However, as analyzed in the previous 
chapter, China is very important, but not indispensible to the U.S. economically. If the perceived 
strategic threats posed by China outweigh the economic benefits in bilateral relations, the U.S. 
may come to the conclusion that it cannot engage and accommodate China without risking being 
dislodged from the Western Pacific. No longer under the illusion of the benefit of engaging 
China, the U.S. will focus on containing China more or less the way it did to the Soviet Union in 
the Cold War. Of course this time it will be much harder for the U.S. since during the Cold War, 
the Western Alliance led by the U.S. was stronger than the Soviet Union by nearly 3:1 in GDP, 
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by over 2:1 in population, and roughly 20 percent in annual defense spending.
90
 When surpassed 
by China in terms of GDP, the U.S. will have fewer choices other than exercising an “offshore 
balancing” strategy by strengthening and encouraging the opponents of China such as Japan, 
South Korea, India, the Philippines, Vietnam, and maybe Russia, to contain China. Among these 
countries, strong U.S. allies with bitter territorial and maritime disputes with China such as Japan 
and/or weaker security partners that have close strategic ties with the U.S. but don‟t enjoy 
compulsory security commitment such as Vietnam will be most prone to intentional incitement 
by the U.S. to confront China militarily. The discrepancy in the U.S.‟s behavior in the 
Senkaku/Diaoyu and Scarborough disputes by Japan and the Philippines with China has revealed 
that the U.S. is realistic enough to place its bet on countries that can stand on its own in 
confronting China without drawing the U.S. directly into a possible conflict. In two decades‟ 
time, as China‟s continued rise becomes harder for the U.S. to manage, the buck-passing 
penchant will be more prominent in the U.S.‟s Asia-Pacific strategy. 
Economically, China and the U.S. are highly interdependent. But as analyzed in Chapter 
I, their economic interdependence seems to be overestimated. Aaron Friedberg writes, “As time 
passes, China will probably become even less susceptible to American economic pressure than it 
is today. Chinese exports to the U.S. may be large, but even now they are greatly overshadowed 
by China‟s exports to its Asian neighbors.”91 The same may hold true for the U.S., with the E.U, 
Canada, and Mexico largely surpassing China as important export destinations. The U.S. may cut 
off all commercial ties with China, ban the export of high-tech commodities and services to 
China, or curb investment made by Chinese companies in America. The Obama administration‟s 
April 2013 decision to ban Huawei, a Chinese telecom giant, from selling its products to the U.S. 
government is just an example of the increasingly frictional economic relations between the U.S. 
and China. Mohan Malik argues, “domestic economic woes may leave Washington with no 
option but to stand up to China on the economic front, and insist that the world‟s largest 
economy “play by the rules of the road,” namely respecting intellectual-property rights, 
revaluing its currency to balance trade, allowing greater market access, and loosening control of 
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its near-monopoly on rare-earth materials.”92 As perceived by China, the U.S. will probably use 
the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) as an instrument to contain China economically or force 
China to play by the rules and norms detrimental to its interests. China‟s concern is justifiable in 
view of the fact that most of the core criteria of the TPP such as the protection of intellectual 
property rights and labor rights, transparency in government procurement, and equal treatment of 
State-owned enterprises and private sectors are designed to neutralize the very advantages of the 
Chinese economy. For its part, well before 2020, China may have managed to promote the 
Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) as a counterweight to the TPP in order 
to roll back the economic sphere of influence of the U.S. in the Asia-Pacific.
93
 This will turn the 
economic cooperation mechanism with both China and the U.S. being members such as the 
APEC into something moribund or useless. The U.S. will do as much as it can to convince its 
allies and partners to minimize their economic ties with China. But the 21
st
 century‟s world is too 
interdependent and complicated, and given the unsuccessful history of the U.S.‟s economic 
sanctions tactics, countries in the region will continue to do business with both China and the 
U.S. while making use of the strategic competition between the two countries. Even worse, as 
Thomas Christensen has pointed out, efforts by Washington to slow China‟s economic growth or 
isolate Beijing diplomatically from the region will backfire because they would harm China‟s 
growth only on the margins while undercutting the U.S. diplomatic position with every country 
in the region, including U.S. allies. As a result, the U.S. would end up much weaker in the region 
in relation to China.
94
 
In terms of security, a U.S.-China Cold War means that the U.S. will make more strategic 
investment in consolidating its alliance network in the Asia-Pacific and seek to establish new 
security partnerships with rising and influential countries in the region such as India, Indonesia, 
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and Vietnam or swing states like Myanmar. The U.S.‟s current efforts to revitalize the alliance 
with Japan and South Korea, increase its military presence in the region by stationing marines on 
a rotational basis in Darwin (Australia) and deploying Littoral Combat Ships in Singapore, return 
to Subic Bay in the Philippines, and convince Vietnam to allow U.S. combat ships access to Cam 
Ranh Bay all point to this direction of future U.S. security strategy to establish a ring to contain 
China strategically. In accordance with its new defense thinking, the U.S. will seek “places not 
bases”, especially choke points to strangle China economically and strategically in case of a 
crisis. As its behavior pattern in the past few years has revealed, the U.S. will also exploit 
territorial and maritime disputes between China and other countries in the East and South China 
Seas to rally more allies and partners to the U.S. while further alienating China from countries in 
the region. For instance, as the U.S. calls on China to resolve maritime disputes with other 
claimants peacefully in accordance with international laws and the 1982 U.N. Convention on the 
Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), the U.S. Senate has failed times and again to ratify UNCLOS itself. 
It will, therefore, fuel more Chinese resentment and rejection against what it perceives as 
America‟s “double standards.”  Furthermore, a new U.S.-China Cold War will probably force the 
U.S. to further polarize the region by inciting and encouraging countries with territorial disputes 
with China to confront China militarily. In other words, the U.S. may try to cause proxy wars or 
conflicts to use countries like Japan, the Philippines, or Vietnam to tie down China in self-
damaging conflicts, which in the end will disrupt China‟s rise, and hence, put an end to the 
strategic challenge to the U.S. in the Asia-Pacific. In this scenario, the U.S. will likely overlook 
the democracy and human rights concerns in its relations with countries like Vietnam and 
Myanmar, provide these countries with lethal weapons so that they can challenge China 
militarily as the U.S.‟s proxies.95  
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Politically, the U.S. will seek to destabilize the current regime in China as much as it can 
to transform the regime or bring about a collapse of the rule by the CCP. In this area, the U.S. 
has much more advantages and tools at its disposal than China. While the U.S. can play the 
democracy, human rights, and religious freedom cards to destabilize China, China has almost no 
similar cards to destabilize the U.S. internally. The U.S. will exploit the socio-economic and 
socio-political contradictions within the Chinese society to fuel the dissent by the public towards 
the regime led by the CCP (if the CCP remains in power by then). It will possibly incite 
separatism in Tibet and Xinjiang to the extent that China has to earmark a considerable amount 
of its resources to quell any unrest.  
3. Scenario No. 3: A U.S.-China Condominium or G-2 
China is simply too big and economically interdependent with the U.S. and many other 
countries in the world for the U.S. to successfully contain China the way it did to the Soviet 
Union in the Cold War. China‟s continued rise and expanded interests and the U.S.‟s reaction 
will be the most important factors shaping future China-U.S. relations. Michael Green has argued 
that the U.S. and the international community have a real stake in the success of China, and in 
developing its society and economy, and that the U.S. will obviously not better off with a return 
to a revolutionary Maoist China or a weak and insecure China. Containing China is, therefore, 
not a realistic option for the U.S.
96
 Therefore, in the next two decades, as China‟s overall power 
approaches that of the U.S., there is a big possibility that the two countries will have to find ways 
to really form a “new type of great power relationship” similar to condominium or a de facto G-2 
within a broader Asian “Concert of Powers,” regardless of whether the U.S. and/or its allies and 
strategic partners in the Asia-Pacific like it or not. 
Analyzing China-U.S. relations, John Ikenberry argues that not all power transition 
generate war or overturn the old order, and that China is working within the Western-oriented 
system instead of seeking to overthrow it. If China continues to follow the existing global order 
and integrates into the Western-oriented system, the U.S. and other Western societies can get 
along with China and the U.S. leadership will remain strong, even though the U.S. global 
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economic position may be weakening.
97
 Many Western scholars such as Arvin Subramanian, 
Hugh White, and Robert Ross tend to argue for the condominium by the U.S. and China. In their 
interactions with American leaders, Chinese high-ranking officials also offered to build a “new 
type of great power relations,” which was perceived by some countries as a G-2 model. Even 
Zbigniew Brezinski, a hard-headed realist, has also advocated the building of a G-2 model that 
enables China and the U.S. to work with each other to address the global financial crisis, tackle 
climate change, and address the problem of nuclear non-proliferation.  After the 18
th
 Congress of 
the CCP, Chinese leaders emphasized the importance of building a “new type of great power 
relations” with the U.S. in order to stabilize the strategic environment critically important for 
China to make use of what it considers “the strategic opportunity period”. The Sunnylands 
(California) informal summit between Obama and Xi Jinping from June 7-8, 2013 may be 
among the first efforts by the U.S. and China to stabilize their relations and envision some form 
of condominium in the future should the situation require. While doubts are cast about the 
prospect of China-U.S. strategic cooperation, it is likely that both countries will seek to engage 
and cooperate with each other as long as they see that the benefits of cooperation still outweigh 
the costs. As China and the U.S. economies are highly interdependent, any disruption in their 
relations will be very detrimental to the interests of either party as well as those of peace and 
stability in the region and the world. The mutually assured destruction in case of a war between 
two nuclear powers and the increasingly binding role of international institutions also mean that 
both China and the U.S. regard violent confrontation as the last resort that they may never want 
to take. 
Joseph Nye dispels offensive realist views about China-U.S. relations, noting that “China 
is a long way from posing the kind of challenge to American preponderance that the Kaiser‟s 
Germany posed when it passed Britain at the beginning of the last century,” and that “there is 
time to manage a cooperative relationship.”98 Michael Evans characterizes the future China-U.S. 
relations as the most significant component of Asia‟s geopolitics which will likely be shaped by 
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the “strategic bipolarity in the midst of economic interdependence” between the two biggest 
economies of the world.
99
 David Shambaugh has also mentioned the “two I‟s” in U.S.-China 
relations, namely institutionalization and interdependence, with institutionalization being the 
outgrowth of interdependence and the manifestation of cooperation.
100
 He pointed out that no 
other inter-governmental relationship in the world comes close to the breadth and depth of issues 
of mutual concern to the U.S. and China and which they are working to address together. By 
2030, such breadth and depth of the China-U.S. relations are expected to be even greater, making 
each country indispensible to the other and their peaceful co-existence indispensible for the 
region and the world. 
Quite a few U.S. government officials themselves have admitted that China‟s rise is not a 
threat because unlike the Soviet Union in the Cold War, China “does not seek to spread radical, 
anti-American ideologies,” “does not see itself in a death struggle with capitalism,” and “does 
not believe that its future depends on overturning the fundamental order of the international 
system.
101
 They understand that China will not rule the world unless the U.S. withdraws from it, 
and that China‟s rise will be a threat to the U.S. and the world only if Washington allows it to 
become one. Therefore, with the right perception and policy on its part and a possibly reciprocal 
response from China, the U.S. will be probably able to share power with China while retaining 
America‟s position and role in the Asia-Pacific and the world. 
On their part, Chinese scholars have also studied peaceful power shifts such as the 
Britain-U.S. power transition to make the case for a similar one between the U.S. and China in 
the future. Feng Yongping holds that for a peaceful power transition to happen, security 
cooperation, cultural homogeneity, and strategic restraint are critical.
102
 In terms of security 
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cooperation and strategic restraint, the U.S. and China have established both bilateral and 
multilateral mechanisms ranging from the Strategic and Economic Dialogue (S&ED), to high-
level military contacts to the Six-Party Talks on Korea. Both countries understand more and 
more that each possesses the ability to inflict great harm on the other should conflict breaks out 
between them. It is this understanding and reality that will make the U.S. and China to co-exist 
peacefully and share power in the next two decades. Regarding cultural homogeneity, despite 
their differences, globalization and China‟s economic reforms has considerably expanded the 
middle class in the country, making more and more of its citizens increasingly amenable, 
favorable, and even addicted to the universal values championed by the U.S. and the West such 
as liberal democracy, the rule of law, and cosmopolitanism. By 2030, this trend will likely gather 
more momentum, not less. Yan Xuetong and Qi Haixia characterized the relationship between 
China and the U.S. as “superficial friends”, contending that as long as the U.S. and China bolster 
strategic trust they can prevent their bilateral relationship from slipping into a Cold War 
scenario.
103
 
There may not be many examples of a condominium between the No. 1 power and No. 2 
power in world politics, especially between two great powers ideologically different as China 
and the U.S., but this possibility cannot be ruled out altogether by 2030. If by this time, China 
has experienced a profound political transformation that makes it closer to the U.S. in terms of 
perception and values, a China-U.S. condominium will be a preferred model for both countries 
when each understands that it cannot totally annihilate or negate the other. Europe has witnessed 
a similar form of de facto condominium between arch enemies like France and Germany after 
the Second World War in promoting the common future for the continent. The history of China-
U.S. relations suggest that basically, Sino-U.S. strategic cooperation happens on two conditions: 
first, both countries have convergent interests or a mutual security concern such as the threat of 
the Soviet Union in the 1970s; second, both countries change their perception towards each 
other. Although the Asia-Pacific is much different from Europe, it is still possible that by 2030, 
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China and the U.S. will understand each other better and learn how to live and cooperate with 
each other for the sake of their own national interests as well as regional peace and stability.  
Although China and the U.S. tend to view their national interests as increasingly 
divergent instead of being convergent, both countries may share greater mutual concerns in the 
decades to come. Addressing global traditional and non-traditional security challenges such as 
climate change, food security, water security, cyber security, world trade, piracy fighting, 
maritime and security require close Sino-U.S. cooperation. David Lampton notes that “there is 
no global issue that can be effectively tackled without Sino-American cooperation.”104 
Moreover, as James H. Nolt has pointed out, China‟s willingness to participate in the liberal 
world economic order designed by the U.S. and its allies illustrates a fundamental difference 
between this era and the 1930s or the Cold War period. Unlike Germany and the Imperial Japan 
in the 1930s or the Soviet Union in the Cold War, China does not, and will probably not in the 
next two decades, seek to challenge or overthrow the current world economic order championed 
by the U.S. because its success as a nation will require it to maintain peaceful and constructive 
relations with the major economic powers: the U.S., the European Union and Japan.
105
 Robert 
Art echoed the same point when he argued that “China does not present the type of security 
threat to the United States that Germany did to Britain, or Britain to Germany,” and that “even if 
it can, “China‟s hegemony on land in East Asia and Southeast Asia will not tip the world balance 
of power”.106 Without not too much of its strategic interests at stake, it would be unwise for the 
U.S. to risk losing its lucrative business ties with China and many other things to confront China. 
In addition to interests and capabilities, perception does matter in international relations. 
If both China and the U.S. change their perception about each other, there will be a greater 
chance for win-win cooperation.  By nature, China does not represent a real threat to the survival 
of the continental America which is an ocean away from China. Nor does China seek to 
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overthrow the liberal democratic system championed by the U.S. as the Soviet Union tried to do 
during the Cold War. What China really wants is that the U.S. accepts a bigger role for China in 
the Asia-Pacific and the world. The U.S. can, and will likely come to terms with this reality as 
China rises, but to the extent that it does not threaten the strategic interests of the U.S. which is a 
superpower with global interests and commitments. As long as China does not seek to kick the 
U.S. out from the Western Pacific and the U.S. stops seeing the rise of China as the most 
formidable challenge to its superpower position and its role in the Asia-Pacific, the room for 
Sino-U.S. strategic cooperation will be greater. During the Cold War, the U.S. made many costly 
mistakes due to strategic misperceptions, for instance its intervention in the Vietnam War. On the 
condition that both China and the U.S. have sensible and far-sighted leaders at the same time, 
leaders who are not blinded by narrowly interpreted national interests or hostage to ultra-
nationalism of domestic politics, China and the U.S. will learn how to coexist and cooperate with 
each other. In the early 1970s, President Nixon made the radical decision in favor of an 
rapprochement with China. In the two decades ahead, it requires an equally courageous U.S. 
President to take the same step, since in a great power relationship engulfed in distrust, the 
initiative should always be taken by the stronger party. The Sunnylands Summit between Obama 
and Xi Jinping shows that China and the U.S. both understand the importance of stabilizing their 
relations and increasing mutual understanding.  
In the event China and the U.S. forge some type of a condominium or even G-2, this will 
require the U.S. to share power with a stronger and more confident China. As Hugh White 
argues, the U.S. will have no other choice but to accept a power-sharing mechanism, otherwise it 
would have to adopt more extreme policies that would be counterproductive for the U.S. and/or 
mutually destructive for both countries and the region at large.
107
 A G-2 future for the Asia-
Pacific will witness the U.S. accepting China‟s sphere of influence in its immediate periphery 
such as Southeast Asia, making important concessions to China on the Taiwan issue to accept the 
island‟s final reunification with the mainland, and abandoning its de facto support for Japan over 
the Senkakus/Diyaou disputes. From an offensive realist perspective, this will effectively spell 
the end of the American hegemony in the Asia-Pacific. But if the U.S. is pragmatic enough, it 
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will recognize that this is a must-do, since the American Era is well over.
108
 For its part, China 
will have to come to terms with the reality that the U.S. will retain its military presence in Japan 
and South Korea, accept the rules and norms of the TPP as the most important FTA in the 
region.
109
 Regarding the sphere of influence, China‟s self-claimed “nine-dashed lines” in the 
South China Sea may be more or less accepted by the U.S. as European powers accepted the 
U.S.‟s Monroe Doctrine in the past. In return, China will probably have to ensure maritime 
security and respect freedom of navigation in the East and South China Seas, which is considered 
a U.S. national interest.  
4. Scenario No. 4: Pax Sinica in place of Pax Americana in the Asia-Pacific 
In When China Rules the World, Martin Jacques views the 2008 global economic 
recession as a seminal event in accelerating the demise of the Pax Americana, and predicts that 
the 21
st
 century will mark “the end of the Western world” and its replacement by a dynamic Pax 
Sinica. In East Asia in particular, Chinese regional dominance will occur sooner rather than later 
and “the present Westphalian system of international relations in East Asia is likely to be 
superseded by something that resembles a modern incarnation of the [traditional Chinese] 
tributary system.”110 Despite all the alarms raised by the West, David Kang has argued that 
concerns over a strong China may be misplaced, noting that “historically, it has been China‟s 
weakness that has led to chaos in Asia. When China has been strong and stable, order has been 
preserved. East Asian regional relations have historically been hierarchic, more peaceful, and 
more stable than those in the West.”111 
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China‟s course of development and political future will be the biggest factors that shape 
China-U.S. relations by 2030. According to Cheng Li, by 2020, there may be three political 
scenarios for China, namely the emergence of a democratic China, prolonged chaos, or a resilient 
and authoritarian China under the rule of the CCP.
112
 American policy-makers, inspired by the 
democratic peace theory, tend to hope and strive for what they consider the best scenario for the 
U.S.-China relations, namely the emergence of a democratic China. However, as Henry 
Kissinger has argued, ancient Chinese thought was more likely than any foreign ideology to 
become the dominant intellectual force behind Chinese foreign policy.
113
 Zbigniew Brezinski 
once famously said that Russia can become either a democracy or an empire, but it cannot 
become both. The same may hold true for China. Chinese rulers, be they feudalist kings, 
nationalist leaders or communist rulers, all have great ambitions and view the whole region and 
even the whole world through a Sino-centric perspective. China‟s very name (the Middle 
Kingdom) reflects that reality. As Gilbert Rozman notes, “the essence of the current prevailing 
Chinese approach to regionalism is Sino-centrism.”114 Actually, the nine-dashed lines that cover 
more than 80 percent of the South China Sea were originally proclaimed by the Nationalist 
government of Chiang Kai-shek, and later on inherited by Chinese communist leaders.
115
 China 
was a regional hegemon for a long time in history. Sino-centrism is ingrained in the mentality of 
any Chinese leader. It was well demonstrated at the 17
th
 ARF in Hanoi in July 2010: when 
cornered by the U.S. and other countries on the South China Sea issue, Chinese Foreign Minister 
Yang Jiechi burst out of control, stated in the face of his Singaporean Foreign Minister George 
Yeo and said: “China is a big country. Other countries are small countries. And that‟s just a 
fact.”116 A recent article in People’s Daily claimed that “through China‟s revitalization, China 
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will lead the post-Western era” and that “China will fundamentally be established as the 
legitimate world leader.”117 
In The China Dream: The Great Power Thinking and Strategic Positioning of China in 
the Post-American Age published in 2010, Liu Mingfu, a senior colonel of the PLA, holds that in 
order to guard its economic rise, China needs to have a “military rise” to contest American 
hegemony. Following events in China closely, William Callahan believes that the “China 
Dream” is an important part of the conversations about China‟s strategic future taking place in 
the barracks, on the Web, and among citizen intellectuals. In response to the book, over 80 
percent of the netizens polled by the newspaper Huanqui Shibao (Global Times) agreed that 
China should pursue global military supremacy.
118
 At present, China remains an authoritarian 
state, but this does not mean that the views of the majority of the Chinese populace are not 
reflected in the thinking and policy-making of the upper echelon of power. With Chinese 
nationalism on the rise and the increasing influence of the PLA on the CCP‟s foreign policy, by 
2030, this thinking will gather much more momentum, not less.  
China views its relations with the U.S. through a historical perspective, in which it sees 
itself as a natural hegemon for centuries while the U.S. has all but become a hegemon for less 
than a century. China is too big and too proud to accept being dictated, much less taught, by any 
other great power how to behave or defend its national interests. That is why when it comes to 
any economic or political experiment, Chinese leaders always emphasize the phrase “with 
Chinese characteristics” (for example, “socialism with Chinese characteristics”) to drive through 
the impression that China is unique. Chinese nationalism has been fueled by three factors, 
namely China‟s glorious past, its “century of humiliation”, and its new-found wealth and power 
accumulated by three decades of reforms initiated by Deng Xiaoping. Therefore, China‟s foreign 
policy and relations with the U.S. will be likely guided by what Chinese leaders regard as their 
core interests and increasingly ardent nationalism. There is no doubt that a truly liberal and 
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democratic China will find it easier to cooperate with the U.S., but democratization is a long and 
incremental process that may take decades or even centuries. It took the U.S. over 200 years 
since independence to become what it is today, and yet the U.S. is still far from being considered 
a perfect example of a liberal democracy. For a country so big and complex like China, that 
process will not be short. History also shows that during the transition from authoritarian rule to 
democratic governance, countries tend to be more volatile at home and aggressive towards its 
neighbors and perceived opponents since politicians have to play the nationalist or populist card 
to vie for power, which is unnecessary in an authoritarian system.
119
 It is therefore ironic that if 
China rises successfully and retain the CCP‟s authoritarian rule by 2030, that may be better for 
China-U.S. relations and peace and stability in the Asia-Pacific. 
In its glorious past, China was the world‟s biggest economy and most powerful country 
for many centuries. If China successfully realizes “the China Dream” trumpeted by Xi Jinping 
and embraced by a large proportion if the Chinese population since the 18
th
 Congress of the 
CCP, it will just return to its previous position in the region and the world. China was a regional 
hegemon for many centuries, so it will not be too unexpected if history repeats itself at some 
stage in the next two or three decades. As the U.S. continues to suffer a relative decline, China‟s 
ambitions to establish Pax Sinica to replace Pax Americana in the Asia-Pacific will just become 
stronger. As analyzed in Chapter I, the strategic thinking of the majority of Chinese elite, 
academia and populace is still greatly influenced by offensive realism which views the 
overthrowing of American hegemony and establishing Chinese hegemony in the region as the 
best way to defend China‟s perceived strategic and core interests. The 2008-2009 global 
financial crisis has led Chinese leaders to believe that it is just a matter of time before China can 
surpass the U.S. in economic terms and subsequently in overall strength. Mao Zedong once told 
Nixon that China could wait 100 years to take back Taiwan. Therefore, in its relations with the 
U.S., China will be patient enough to wait until it wears out the U.S. in the contest for primacy in 
the Asia-Pacific and finally in the world. In this long battle, China possesses so many advantages 
over the U.S. and understands that time is always on its side. 
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Economically, China has virtually dethroned the U.S. as the most influential player in 
Asia, and this trend will be even more firmly demonstrated by 2030. At present, as Lowell 
Dittmer has pointed out, “Asia is the largest beneficiary of China‟s economic upsurge. China has 
displaced the U.S. as the biggest trade partner of economic powerhouses Japan, Taiwan and 
South Korea.
120
 A study of China‟s economic growth and its impact on the Sino-U.S. balance of 
power estimates that by 2040 China‟s hard power may reach between 58 percent and 113 percent 
of that of the United States.
121
 Because of its centrality in Asian geopolitics, China will not need 
to equal the U.S. in terms of hard power to replace the U.S. as the predominance power in Asia. 
As a superpower with global interests and commitments, the U.S. has to scatter its resources 
while China can focus only on its home theater of the Asia-Pacific. 
In The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers, Paul Kennedy argues that empires often fall 
due to military overstretch. In today‟s world, economic decline or collapse are primarily 
responsible for the fall of the great powers, with the disintegration of the Soviet Union at the end 
of the Cold War being one of the most striking examples. Well aware of the importance of 
economic development for its rise and the realization of the “China Dream”, China has always 
emphasized its “peaceful development” and attached great importance to prolonging the 
“strategic opportunity period” until it equals the U.S. relatively in terms of overall strength. 
Arvind Subramanian predicts that by 2030, relative U.S. decline will have yielded not a 
multipolar world but near-unipolar one dominated by China, with China accounting for about 20 
percent of global GDP as compared to just under 15 percent for the United States.
122
 In two 
decades‟ time, with China‟s economy eclipsing that of the U.S., political influence will naturally 
come with China‟s new-found economic strength, making China the de facto leader of the order 
in the Asia-Pacific and even in the world.  
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5. The “Black Swan” Scenarios 
There is a good chance that none of the afore-mentioned scenarios will happen due to 
unexpected and/or unpredictable developments which Donald Rumsfeld, former U.S. Secretary 
of Defense, termed “the unknown unknowns” (or things that we do not know we don‟t know).123 
The factors that could affect whether China‟s future leaders will challenge or uphold the regional 
status quo are diverse and unfortunately indeterminate. They could include balance-of-power 
considerations, economic resource needs, domestic political considerations, or perceived 
infringements on China‟s sovereignty or status.124 James Dobbins has argued that despite 
cautious and pragmatic Chinese policies, the risk of Sino-U.S. conflicts remains and will grow in 
consequences and probability as China‟s strength increases. Among the sources of the most 
likely conflicts between China and the U.S. over the next 30 years are changes in the status of 
North Korea and Taiwan, Sino-U.S. confrontation in cyberspace, and disputes arising from 
China‟s uneasy relationships with Japan and India.125 
It is hard to imagine that within a short span of time of just 20 years since the end of the 
Cold War, the U.S. has experienced its fortune shifting so fast, from being firmly in the peak of 
the post-Cold War world order to finding itself in a relative decline today. In two decades‟ time, 
the U.S. may rebound once again, or fall further into a deep decline. Similarly, China may 
continue to rise or get stuck in the middle-income trap. While it is hard to forecast the future of 
the U.S, it is even harder to imagine how China will be by 2030 since China‟s system is much 
more opaque than that of the U.S. and China is a very big and complex country. Therefore, it is 
impossible for even the most capable scholars to predict the exact shape of the U.S. and China by 
2030 and how their relations will be like. Ian Bremer has argued that between now and 2020, 
Washington and Beijing will have to grapple with the fact that China‟s decoupling, the friction 
generated by the collision of free-market and state capitalism, and competition for scarce 
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resources will push the two sides towards confrontation.
126
 As a result, China‟s foreign policy 
and its relations with the U.S. may be susceptible to the temperature of Chinese domestic 
politics. If China falls into an internal crisis, there is a good chance that its leaders will have to 
either turn inward to stabilize the country or seek an adventure abroad to divert public attention. 
Zbigniew Brezinski notes that “if China were to succumb to internal violence, for example, all 
bets are off. If socio-political tensions or social inequality becomes unmanageable, the leadership 
might be tempted to exploit nationalist passions.”127 If the collapse or crisis scenarios for China‟s 
political future in the next 10-15 years (as often predicted by scholars like Gordon Chang or 
Minxin Pei) turn out to be true, Chinese leaders will likely manipulate the territorial and 
maritime disputes with Japan, the Philippines, India, and Vietnam to shore up support at home 
for political ends or rally Chinese national unity. In that case, whether it wants or nor, the U.S. 
will have to intervene directly or indirectly to defend its allies Japan or the Philippines, otherwise 
it credibility and role as the superpower will evaporate. 
All the four scenarios mentioned earlier are based on the assumption that China will get 
stronger and stronger economically and militarily. None of these anticipates a weak China. 
However, there is also a possibility that China‟s rise will be short-lived, and China may fall into 
the middle-income trap, which deprives it of the ability to challenge the U.S. in the next two 
decades or so. Joseph Nye cited the case of Japan as an example to illustrate how dangerous it is 
to adopt a linear projection to predict the future of a great power. In the 1980s, the whole world 
assumed that Japan would finally surpass the U.S. and become a superpower itself. By that time 
the “Japan-buys-the-whole-world” notion was very popular. Yet Japan fell into two “lost 
decades” of economic recession and political deadlock right after it had reached the peak of its 
development. This shows that the development course of a country can be disrupted by 
unpredicted detours. The same may happen to China. As compared to Japan, China still has 
much more space for continued development. But it remains hard to predict how China‟s 
political and economic future will be by 2030. Economically, it is now widely recognized that 
China‟s growth model that proved to be so successful over the past three decades has exhausted 
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itself, and that China has to find another development model should it want to keep the internal 
socio-economic and socio-political contradictions under check. Recent signs of a slowdown in 
China‟s economic growth rate as well as the recovery of the U.S. economy mean that the power 
gap between the U.S. and China may not be fully closed by 2030 as previously predicted. 
According to a report prepared by the Atlantic Council, there is a possibility that well before 
2030, the U.S.‟s main concern will be how to deal with a weak and unstable China rather than a 
rising China.
128
 As history has shown, a weak and insecure China may present serious challenges 
to the U.S. and regional stability than a strong and stable China. The 1950-1953 Korean War, 
1962 China-India border war and the 1979 China-Vietnam border war have all shown that  China 
seems to be most dangerous and unpredictable when it is weak, isolated or strategically 
contained because it may feel that it has nothing to lose. Alexander Vuving also predicted that if 
China continues its current investment-driven and export-led path, it can hardly avoid a long 
period of stagnation in the future, which will likely become acute in the 2030s.
129
 Compounded 
by external territorial disputes and rising nationalism, China‟s economic troubles may render its 
leaders irrational to the extent that they may take actions that risks confrontation with the U.S. 
and/or the U.S. allies in the region. 
Another “black swan” in the power equation in the Indo-Pacific may be the rise of India 
by 2030. While China is suffering a demographic distortion due to its one-child policy, India will 
have a much better demographic structure by 2030, which makes it economically competitive. 
Many scholars predict that by 2030, India will assume the current role played by China as a 
rising power in the Indo-Pacific. It is predicted that India will become the world‟s most populous 
nation in 2031, and that it will have a PPP GDP nearly 90 percent as large as that of the U.S. by 
that time.
130
 If that is the case, the strategic chessboard in the region will be largely shaped by the 
U.S.-China-India strategic triangle. As Robert Ayson has pointed out, the short-term strategic 
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competition in the region will be between China and Japan, the medium-term competition 
between China and the U.S., and the long-term competition between China and India.
131
 
Therefore, another possibility is that the strategic frictions and competition between China and 
the U.S. will be dampened because China can hardly afford to “fight a two-front war” with both 
India and the U.S. at the same time.  
Is there a possibility of war and conflict? 
In unexpected circumstances and crises either within China or in its periphery, China‟s 
external behavior could be very extreme. History has more than once shown that even a weak 
China under the authoritarian rule of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) still had no hesitation 
about confronting the U.S. or other strong opponents militarily. In 1950, China had barely 
emerged from the devastating civil war between communist and nationalist forces, and did not 
possess nuclear weapons as did the U.S. But that did not prevent China from intervening in the 
1950-1953 Korean War when it felt its buffer zone encroached. In 1979, after the devastating 
Cultural Revolution, China‟s GDP accounted for a meager 2 percent of the world‟s GDP and the 
PLA was a very backward fighting force as compared to the combination of the large Soviet Red 
Army and the battle-hardened Vietnamese military. Yet Deng Xiaoping still decided to launch a 
limited war against Vietnam despite the risk of having to fight on two fronts should the Soviet 
Union respect the alliance treaty it signed with Vietnam in 1978. Mao Zedong himself once 
famously said that China did not fear the frightening prospect of a nuclear war with the U.S., 
claiming that 500 million Chinese survivors from the nuclear war could rebuild China, while it is 
impossible for the U.S. to do the same. All of these historical facts show that when it comes to 
foreign policy, an authoritarian China can be very unpredictable, reckless, reactive, and 
incomprehensible. China‟s behavior seems to defy the most logical and sensible analysis by the 
best Western scholars and analysts. In Hugh White‟s words, “war in Asia remains thinkable 
because the international order that has kept the peace for more than 30 years is under 
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pressure.”132 As China rises and likely closes the power gap between it and the U.S. sometime by 
2030, this pressure will be even greater. Therefore, should another “Tiananmen incident” happen 
or China-Japan tensions over the Senkakus/Diaoyu escalate into armed conflict, the risk of the 
U.S. being drawn into a military conflict with China will be very high indeed.  
What are the most likely scenarios? 
Taking into account major factors influencing the course of China-U.S. relations, it seems 
that as the power gap between the U.S. and China narrows, the scenarios involving rivalry at 
various extents such as strategic competition in peaceful coexistence or a new Cold War will 
become more likely. Back in 2006, Peter Hays Gries made the forecast that by 2015, there would 
be a 45 percent chance that China-U.S. relations would be characterized by rivalry, and a 35 
percent chance that the U.S. and China would be partners.
133
 Given the correlation of power 
between China and the U.S. by 2030, scenario No. 1 and scenario No. 2 seem to be most likely 
while a China-U.S. condominium (G-2) or a Pax Sinica seem less likely to happen. For instance, 
Elizabeth Economy has argued that the G-2 formula between China and the U.S. is all but a 
mirage for China and the U.S. are so different by nature, and that if the U.S. wants to move its 
relationship with China forward for the next 30 years, it needs the rest of the world, not just 
China, on board.
134
 By the time of writing, this task is already well beyond the capability of the 
U.S., and will be almost mission impossible for the U.S. by 2030. 
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CHAPTER III: IMPLICATIONS OF THE FUTURE OF CHINA-U.S. 
RELATIONS ON THE SECURITY ARCHITECTURE IN THE ASIA-
PACIFIC: THE WAY AHEAD 
 
1. The Asia-Pacific - the principal playground of China and the U.S. by 2030 
The Asia-Pacific is well on its way to become a center of gravity of world politics in the 
21
st
 century. Hillary Clinton has famously noted that the future of politics will be decided in 
Asia, not Afghanistan or Iraq, and that the Asia-Pacific has become a driver of global politics.
135
 
The shift of global power from the West to the East and the economic dynamism of the Asia-
Pacific with three largest economies in the world mean that the region will be an increasingly 
important contest ground for major powers, especially China and the U.S. in the upcoming 
decades. Both China and the U.S. consider the Asia-Pacific the most important platform to 
maintain and enhance their role and power in the 21
st
 century, with China acting assertively in 
the East and South China Seas and officially declaring its goal to become a “maritime power” at 
the 18
th
 Congress of the CCP, and the U.S. officially announcing its rebalancing strategy in the 
Asia-Pacific. The greater focus of China and the U.S. on the Asia-Pacific will likely lead to more 
interaction and friction between the two biggest players in world politics. In addition, since most 
of the potential flashpoints in the region such as Taiwan, the Korean peninsula, 
Senkaku/Diyaoyu islands and the Spratlys involve China and the U.S. allies, the shape of future 
China-U.S. relations will have a direct and profound impact on the security architecture in the 
Asia-Pacific. 
While much uncertainty remains about China-U.S. relations by 2030, it is evident that the 
rise of China will be unstoppable and that China will not be satisfied with the current order in the 
Asia-Pacific. Kishore Mahbubani argues that whether or not China‟s rise is benign depends on 
whether or not the world [and the U.S.] allows China to rise peacefully. He holds that managing 
China‟s rise is the biggest challenge the world faces today, admitting that there are voices in 
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Washington supporting designs to disrupt China‟s growth.136 Whether they admit it or not, many 
officials in the Obama administration perceive that the principal goal of the Asia Pivot or 
rebalancing strategy is to contain China strategically in the Asia-Pacific. 
Given China‟s rapid rise and the U.S.‟s relative decline, there has been a sense of 
uncertainty in the region as to how China-U.S. relations and the power equation in the Asia-
Pacific will look like in the coming decades. Aaron Friedberg has written, “if the historical 
correlation between extraordinary rapid internal growth and external expansion holds, the 
implications for Asian stability will be troubling indeed.”137 While the conventional knowledge 
points to the likelihood of China-U.S. strategic competition and rivalry by 2030, there are also 
possibilities that the 21
st
 century‟s international relations will offer new dynamism for more 
optimistic futures of China-U.S. relations. Amitav Acharya has mentioned “conservative 
regionalism” in East Asia and Southeast Asia, which emphasizes the process of conflict 
management and effective security cooperation in which many Asia states enmesh both China 
and the U.S. into a mosaic of bilateral and regional ties that dissipate the potential for conflict. 
He argues that despite many unresolved security concerns, most of Asia has become more, not 
less, stable since the end of the Cold War.
138
 Phillip Saunders has noted, “the U.S. and China are 
not inevitable enemies, but managing the competitive aspects of the bilateral relationship will 
require wise leadership on both sides of the Pacific… If the two countries manage their relations 
carefully, the negative impact of strategic competition on the broader relationship may remain 
modest.”139 There is a possibility that China-U.S. relations will likely be shaped by a common 
commitment to avoid conflict, cooperate in areas of common interest, and prevent disputes from 
shaking the overall relationship.
140
 The aforementioned analysis and expectation seem to center 
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on more benign scenarios of China-U.S. relations which will be, by and large, in the interests of 
both countries and the whole region. 
No Asian country would want to have to take sides with either China or the U.S. or face a 
future without a credible role of either power in the regional security architecture by 2030. As 
Evelyn Goh notes, “many actors in the region, including Singapore, Thailand, and Vietnam, 
seem to want to hedge their bets in the face of a potential U.S.-China military showdown, rather 
than simply lean toward the U.S. They do not want to be forced to choose the U.S. over 
China.”141 Most East and Southeast Asian states want the U.S. to be firmly anchored and 
engaged in the region to balance both China‟s rise and to assuage Japan‟s fears caused by 
China‟s rise and America‟s relative decline. Even countries most closely tied to the U.S. 
strategically will have no stake in antagonizing China or seeing China-U.S. relations deteriorate. 
As Evan S. Medeiros notes: “None [of America‟s allies] want to provoke China or be drawn into 
a containment effort; none want China to dominate the region; none want the U.S. to leave or 
even substantially draw down its presence; and all [states] want to play a major role in managing 
regional challenges. American foreign policy needs to reflect these changing regional 
realities.”142 Mohan Malik has also explained that “all [countries] want to benefit from economic 
ties with China, but none want the region dominated by Beijing or their policy options 
constrained by China. Put simply, there is no desire to replace the fading American hegemony 
with Chinese hegemony.”143 
From the view of the NIC Global Trends 2030 Report, “a collapse or sudden retreat of 
U.S. power would most likely result in an extended period of global anarchy,” with “no stable 
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international system and no leading power to replace the U.S.”144 However, this prospect as well 
as the possibility of a hegemonic transition in the Asia-Pacific will be very unlikely by 2030. As 
Mark Beeson has explained, “it is clear that China is not yet - and possibly may never be - in a 
position to replace the U.S. as the dominant power in the region. Not only does China still lack 
some of the requisite material strengths of the U.S., but - the “Beijing Consensus” 
notwithstanding - it lacks a distinctive vision or ideology around which supportive states might 
coalesce.”145 No matter how powerful China may become by 2030, the U.S. will likely be able to 
retain its important, if not predominant, position in the Asia-Pacific. 
Therefore, in all likelihood, China and the U.S. will by 2030 be the two most important 
players in the Asia-Pacific. Given the region‟s lack of institutionalism as compared to Europe, 
especially in terms of multilateral mechanism for security cooperation, China-U.S. relations will 
probably be characterized by some level of uncertainty. According to Namrata Goswami, this 
possibility means that engagement and balancing will go hand in hand as necessary policy tools 
for states to deal with the power shift in the region.
146
 
2. What is the best scenario in China-U.S. relations for the Asia-Pacific? 
It is hardly disputable that China-U.S. relations will define the evolving security 
architecture in the Asia-Pacific. Given China‟s geo-political centrality in the region and its 
continued rise, it will be impossible for the U.S. to deny China a bigger role in any future 
regional order. To some extent, all countries in the Asia-Pacific will have a common 
denominator in a peaceful, stable, transparent and predictable relationship between China and the 
U.S. by 2030 and beyond. If China-U.S. relations get entangled in violent conflicts, this will 
cause great harm to the region. It is, therefore, the shared interest of all countries in the region to 
avoid a classical security dilemma between China and the U.S., which will require the efforts of 
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not only China and the U.S. themselves, but also that of all other stakeholders in the Asia-
Pacific.  
Many scholars and politicians in the Asia-Pacific have envisioned the establishment of a 
regional architecture that is open, inclusive and trans-Pacific. Any future regional arrangement or 
mechanism without the active participation of China is not going to be successful. China must be 
given more power as well as encouraged to take on more responsibility that reflects its new-
found strength and stature. If this is the case, a China-U.S. condominium (G-2) seems to be the 
ideal scenario that will accommodate China and retain the U.S.‟s role as a Pacific power. 
However, if this scenario materializes, the U.S.‟s allies such as Japan and South Korea would 
feel marginalized and seek more independence from the U.S., even by becoming nuclear powers. 
Other major powers such as Russia and India will prefer a multi-polar order with themselves 
playing a decent role instead of accepting a China-U.S. G-2 condominium. Therefore, the hardest 
question for the U.S. by 2030 will be how to give China more power and incorporate it into the 
regional security architecture without sending a wrong message to both China and other 
important players in the region. As David Shambaugh has insightfully analyzed, facing the 
stellar rise of China, Washington and the West are caught in a real conundrum: to get tough with 
China is likely to produce more Chinese toughness in response, but to be conciliatory will only 
strengthen the (Chinese) realist‟s self-interest “China first” orientation.147 
The idea of a broad, inclusive and open regional architecture has been tried with both 
success and failure in the past, be it Kevin Rudd‟s Pacific Community or Yukio Hatoyama‟s East 
Asian Community. Some scholars also mentioned the prospect of turning the Six-Party Talks on 
the Korean Peninsula into some kind of a 21
st
 century Asian Concert of Power.
148
 All these 
initiatives are worth trying and experimenting in the coming decades. The fact that some of these 
initiatives failed does not mean that countries in the Asia-Pacific should not try more or the 
future of the region is doomed to a classical balance of power and strategic competition between 
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major powers, especially China and the United States. As Kenneth Lieberthal has pointed out, “it 
is important for the U.S. and China to welcome each other into any wide-ranging Asian 
multilateral forum in which either one participates.”149 This will develop the habit of cooperation 
between the two countries. It was hard to imagine by 1914 that Europe would one day enjoy the 
peaceful and relatively prosperous future (notwithstanding the ongoing Eurozone crisis) that it is 
having today. Asia-Pacific countries can learn to do the same without repeating the bitter lessons 
that Europe had in the First and Second World Wars. Although it is more and more assertive as 
its power continues to grow, China has also understood that taking the path that the Imperial 
Japan and Germany took before the Second World War only ruin China‟s ambitions and the so-
called “China Dream”. That is why at various regional and multilateral forums, Chinese leaders 
have painstakingly emphasized China‟s “peaceful development”. Increasingly nationalistic and 
populist as its foreign policy is, China‟s Communist Party has so far, and will likely be able to 
control the PLA in the years to come as it did over the past decades. 
3. The way forward: How will ASEAN fit in the new power equation in the Asia-Pacific 
by 2030? 
Southeast Asia has always been the contest ground for great power strategic competition. 
Carlyle Thayer has pointed out that great power rivalry and competition can affect Southeast 
Asian security despite the best efforts by ASEAN to insulate itself from these forces, and that 
Southeast Asia will continue to be affected by Sino-American rivalry and military 
competition.
150
 The relations between ASEAN and China have been characterized by Martin 
Stuart-Fox (2003): 
“The ASEAN ten will do all in their power not to provoke China. What they want is to both slow 
and ease the changing power balance. They want the U.S. to remain a powerful presence, serving as a 
balancing force in the regional power equation, and have made this known; but they do not want to be 
part of any balance-of-power coalition. At the same time, they also want to make room for China.”151 
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Jorn Dosch observes that ASEAN has adopted a policy of keeping its international 
options open and never leaning to heavily towards one big power. This policy served ASEAN‟s 
interests well during the Cold War, and seems to be working under the current and future 
structural circumstances, too. While most Southeast Asian states hedge against China primarily 
by accepting the need for a U.S. role in the region, the acceptance of Chinese leadership among 
the Southeast Asian governments is growing.
152
 Every country in the region wants ASEAN to be 
in the driver‟s seat of regional cooperation because ASEAN‟s leadership is more acceptable in 
the region than China‟s or Japan‟s.153 Kishore Mahbubani notes that even rising powers such as 
China and India realize that it is in their interest to continue the current ASEAN-led cooperative 
order in Asia.
154
 Therefore, ASEAN clearly enjoys a comparative advantage in a regional 
strategic chessboard characterized by great power competition and distrust. As long as China-
U.S. relations do not swing to the extremes of the spectrum, namely either a G-2 condominium 
or direct confrontation, ASEAN will stand to benefit and have a decent role. 
To date, ASEAN has been successful both as a regional organization and an honest 
power broker in the Asia-Pacific. No other regional organization of small and medium countries 
like ASEAN can engage and provide a platform for interaction among so many great powers in 
the world, namely the U.S., China, Russia, Japan, India, and the European Union. The success of 
ASEAN-led mechanisms such as the East Asia Summit (EAS), ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), 
ASEAN Defense Ministers Meeting Plus (ADMM Plus) demonstrates that seemingly all the 
roads towards a workable form of regional architecture lead to ASEAN. In the next decade or so, 
with China and the U.S. likely to engage in continued cooperation and strategic competition, this 
role of ASEAN will be even more prominent if it can preserve its centrality and play its cards 
well. However, there is also an imminent risk of ASEAN being further divided and polarized by 
China-U.S. strategic competition. The ASEAN Chairmanship role played by Cambodia in 2012, 
especially the historic failure of the 45
th
 ASEAN Ministerial Meeting (AMM-45) to issue a Joint 
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Communiqué has testified to the challenge ASEAN will be facing as the great power competition 
between China and the U.S. becomes more intense in the coming years. China has been 
relatively successful in its “divide and rule” tactics with regards to ASEAN, using its enormous 
economic and diplomatic clout to convince many ASEAN member states that it is useless to 
resist Chinese power. 
It seems that the best scenario of the China-U.S. relations for ASEAN will be the first 
one, with the two superpowers competing peacefully by 2030, thus leaving ASEAN some room 
for strategic maneuvering. As the two competing superpowers have no other better channel to 
demonstrate and reconcile their differences, ASEAN will continue to serve as a venue for great 
power interaction between China and the U.S. as it did since the end of the Cold War. At the 11
th
 
Shangri-La Dialogue in Singapore in May 2012, Indonesian President Susilo B. Yudhoyono 
stated that small and medium powers can lock the great powers (China and the U.S.) into a 
durable regional architecture.
155
 This is not merely rhetoric, but reflects the trend of power 
diffusion in the 21
st
 century that gives smaller players in international relations more leverage.  
In a new Cold War scenario, ASEAN‟s role will probably be marginalized and its 
centrality lost, with its member states taking sides either with China or the United States. Brantly 
Womack notes, “Ironically, whichever country (China or the U.S.) requires Southeast Asia to 
choose is likely to lose the competition for influence, because the act of forcing the choice will 
be taken as proof of that country‟s hegemonic desires.”156 There is a great possibility that Laos, 
Cambodia, and Myanmar will openly bandwagon with China altogether by 2030 while the 
Philippines and Singapore may align themselves closer to the United States. Countries with more 
independent foreign policy such as Indonesia and Vietnam will likely adopt a proactive non-
aligned stature, with the remaining members of ASEAN such as Thailand, Malaysia and Brunei 
following a really pragmatic policy of accommodating China economically while retaining their 
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security ties with the United States. Countries in the region will be strategically aligned along 
two principal blocs led by the U.S. and China.  
Similarly, in the other scenarios of a China-U.S. condominium (G-2) or Pax Sinica, 
ASEAN‟s relevance and rationale will be diminished or even lost. In either circumstance, due to 
its proximity to China, Southeast Asian countries will fall under the sphere of influence of or 
even domination by China, which the U.S. will have to accept. ASEAN‟s centrality and ASEAN-
led multilateral mechanisms such as the EAS, ARF, ADMM Plus will be replaced by either a 
bilateral mechanism between China and the U.S. or China-centered forums. It is out of this fear 
that ASEAN will try it best to keep the U.S. engaged in the region and maintain the liberal order 
with American predominance as long as it can. 
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CONCLUSION 
As the NIC Global Trends 2030 Report has rightly concludes, there is no predetermined 
answer to what the world will look like in 2030. The same holds true for China-U.S. relations. 
Whether the future of China-U.S. relations turns out to be benign or malign depends on a lot of 
factors, including policies that China, the U.S. and other countries in the Asia-Pacific region will 
follow from now to 2030. All of these uncertainties notwithstanding, there are some general 
observations that can be drawn: 
First, it is likely that cooperation and strategic competition will continue to be two 
intertwined undercurrents of China-U.S. relations by 2030. However novel and revolutionary 
international relations in the 21
st
 century become, China-U.S. relations will never escape the 
inevitable rule of power shift and power transition, which is largely influenced by realist and 
zero-sum mentality of a significant section of the academia, politicians, decision-makers, and 
population from both sides. Only the extent to which they are influenced can be different from 
the past. At the same time, there is little doubt that China and the U.S. will have to work out 
ways to cooperate and stabilize their relations in the years ahead because neither country has 
enough power to neutralize its strategic competitor completely in the power equation in the Asia-
Pacific region and the world. China and the U.S. will be both partners and strategic competitors. 
As the power gap between the two countries narrows and may be even closed by 2030, strategic 
frictions arising from the security dilemma will be more prominent. This research has also found 
that the current literature on China-U.S. relations is greatly influenced by realism and neo-
realism while liberalism and neo-liberalism play a relatively limited part. That is why among the 
possible scenarios for China-U.S. relations by 2030, those involving competition and rivalry are 
considered more realistic from both the academic and practical perspectives. Therefore, this 
research gap needs to be addressed in the future by more studies on possible forms and models 
for China-U.S. cooperation instead of assuming that the two countries seem to be destined for 
strategic rivalry. 
Second, since foreign policy is the extension of domestic policy, it is expected that 
domestic politics will greatly influence the course of future China-U.S. relations. Like human 
beings, states act rationally at some time, and irrationally at others. Both China and the U.S. have 
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internal problems that may become great obstacles to stable relations with each other in the years 
ahead. China‟s policy towards the U.S. will be affected by a rising nationalism characterized by 
both the superiority complex and inferiority complex towards the West and the United States. 
For its part, the U.S.‟s economic woes and partisan politics will deprive it of consistency and 
stability in its China policy, thereby raising the risk of allowing political calculations to override 
reason and logic necessary for dealing with a very complicated rising power like China. In other 
words, China-U.S. relations may become hostage to domestic politics of either country, thus 
increasing strategic frictions. If China and the U.S. slide into a new Cold War by 2030, domestic 
politics will be largely responsible. While the correlation of power between China and the U.S. is 
a major factor that shapes the relationship between the two countries, the leadership in either 
country will have an important role in deciding which direction China-U.S. relations will take. 
This reality suggests that in addition to employing the theories of international relations, the 
study and analysis of domestic politics and even individual leaders can help ameliorate the 
possible shape of future China-U.S. relations. 
Third, whether China-U.S. relations will be characterized by more competition or 
cooperation also depends on the situation in the region and the world. China-U.S. relations will 
be more and more susceptible to unpredictable crises in the strategic environment in the world or 
the Asia-Pacific region that may be beyond the control of either side. In the 21
st
 century, power 
will diffuse more and more, enabling many other players, be they states or non-state actors, to 
have some influence on the shape of China-U.S. relations. In an unpredictable world, there are 
also many unknowns that can affect China-U.S. relations, for instance, the outbreak of a terrorist 
attack like 9/11, territorial or maritime conflicts or skirmishes between China and some U.S. 
allies, or even a sudden crisis or collapse of the current regime in China. In retrospect, the 
Tiananmen incident in 1989 changed the perception of the U.S. towards China which had 
enjoyed fairly good relations with the U.S. since President Nixon‟s 1972 visit. Today, according 
to various statistics, there are hundreds of thousands of mass incidents in China every year, 
which will only be greater in size and scope should China‟s internal contradictions continue to 
deepen in the upcoming years. In the wake of the Arab Spring, it is impossible to know how 
resilient authoritarian regimes can be. If China experiences internal upheavals or even 
revolutions, the impact on China-U.S. relations will be unimaginable. Similarly, in just 8 years of 
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President George W. Bush‟s two terms of office, it is hard to imagine that the U.S.‟s reckless 
plunge into the global war against terrorism and the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan would cost 
America so much in terms of resources and standing in the world. From now to 2030, unforeseen 
events may create profound ramifications on China-US. relations. In many cases, the course of 
history has been shaped by accidents well beyond prediction. For a relationship as complex as 
that between China and the U.S., this scenario cannot be ruled out altogether. 
Forth, managing China‟s rise and integrating it into the regional security architecture by 
2030 will require strategic vision on the part of the U.S. and constructive interaction by all other 
major players in the Asia-Pacific chessboard. Given the growing security dilemma, China and 
the U.S may easily fall prey to worst case thinking and zero-sum mentality. Strategic rivalry in 
China-U.S. relations will probably polarize the Asia-Pacific region, adversely affecting its 
dynamic economic development while forcing regional countries to spend more on arms to 
hedge against China or prepare for a pessimistic scenario of China-U.S. relations. Therefore, the 
need to build strategic trust between China and the U.S. will become more and more urgent. 
Some “code of conduct” between the two countries to avoid miscalculation and manage crisis 
will have to be worked out if China and the U.S. are to preserve long-term stability in their 
relations. In this process, ASEAN will be able to play the role of an honest broker because unlike 
other major powers such as Japan, India and China, it has the luxury of not being a strategic 
competitor of China or the U.S. while having relatively good relations with both countries. 
ASEAN will, to a certain extent, be a game-changer in the balance of power in the Asia-Pacific 
at times of continued China-U.S. strategic competition. It will be in ASEAN‟s best interest to 
engage both China and the U.S. in multilateral mechanism led by ASEAN in the region and 
participated by all the major powers in the region. In the most likely scenarios of China-U.S. 
relations by 2030, it seems that ASEAN will continue to be courted both by China and the U.S. 
as well as other major powers. The strategic partnerships that ASEAN has established with many 
major powers such as China, Japan, and India has testified to ASEAN‟s increasing strategic 
importance in the Asia-Pacific region. To date, literature on the role of ASEAN in China-U.S. 
relations seems to depict ASEAN as a pawn in Sino-American power play, which is far from 
fully understanding the positive role that ASEAN can play in helping steer the China-U.S. 
relations in a course which is in the best interest for peace and prosperity the region. This Thesis 
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has also not fully elaborated on the role that ASEAN can play in certain scenarios for China-U.S. 
relations by 2030. Therefore, more future research should be conducted on the added values that 
ASEAN can bring to a more benign future of China-U.S. relations. 
Finally, to understand the true nature of China-U.S. relations and make the right forecast 
about their future course, it is necessary to study a wide range of literature that provides a 
comprehensive and balanced mosaic instead of relying on academic works by Chinese and 
American scholars. As direct stakeholders, Chinese and American scholars cannot be totally free 
from bias in their analysis of China-U.S. relations. Similarly, academic sources from countries 
with direct stakes in the ups and downs of China-U.S. relations such as Japan, South Korea, 
India, the Philippines, and Vietnam are also affected to some extent by the national perspective 
of scholars and even by the burden or legacy of history of their countries in relations with China. 
On the other hand, academic works from scholars in countries in the region that have a relative 
equidistance in their relations with China and the U.S. such as Australia and New Zealand can 
provide an additional and reliable source of research which can be more balanced and objective. 
The views expressed by scholars from these countries are not always well understood or 
positively received by the audience in China, the U.S., Japan, the Philippines, and Vietnam, but 
they do offer a cool-headed and rational approach to dealing with fluctuations and even 
upheavals in China-U.S. relations at a time of power shift. From both academic and practical 
perspective, the enhanced engagement of Australia and New Zealand in the ongoing region-wide 
deliberation on how to manage China-U.S. relations and build a sustainable security architecture 
in the Asia-Pacific is very important. This reality should not be lost on the thinking of policy-
making circles in the region, especially those of ASEAN countries and Vietnam in particular.  
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